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1STILL MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM: PREDATORY LENDING, 
PREEMPTION, AND FEDERALLY-SUPPORTED LENDERS 
This article discusses the continuing problem of predatory lending abuses in the subprime 
home mortgage lending market and federal and state attempts to address the problem.  Over the 
protests of consumer advocates, federal agencies have recently issued regulations preempting 
state predatory lending statutes as applied to national banks and thrifts.  In addition, Congress is 
considering legislation that would preempt state predatory lending laws for all lenders.  The 
article considers the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federally-supported 
lenders–banks, thrifts, and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.  Banks and thrifts receive support through the federal safety net, which includes 
deposit insurance.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally chartered, privately-owned 
corporations that receive other types of federal support.  The article concludes that preemption is 
not warranted for national banks and thrifts or for other lenders, and that banks, thrifts, and the 
GSEs should be part of the solution to the predatory lending problem by originating, purchasing, 
and/or securitizing subprime loans in compliance with state and federal law.
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3Citigroup is the largest financial services company in the world.1  Its retail banking 
group, operating under the name Citibank, includes a number of national banks with federal 
charters.2  Citigroup and Citibank are affiliated with a subprime lender3 who has engaged in 
predatory mortgage lending practices.
Associates First Capital was notorious for its predatory lending practices in 2000 when 
Citigroup purchased the company.4  Associates was at the time under investigation by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Department “as epitomizing ‘predatory’ tactics 
that strip away equity in homes of unsophisticated borrowers by making loans with deceptive 
terms and fees.”5  Associates’ practices included making loans with high interest rates, large 
upfront fees, balloon payments, and prepayment penalties as well as aggressively selling single-
1See HOOVER’S IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, Citigroup Inc. (Sept. 7, 2005), available 
at 2005 WLNR 14057524.
2See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks Active As of 9/30/05, at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/foia/nblist_Name_St_City_BankNet.pdf.
3Subprime lenders are lenders who make subprime loans, which are loans to borrowers 
with a higher credit risk.  See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text for a more extensive 
discussion of subprime lending.
4See Richard A. Oppel & Patrick McGeehan, Along With a Lender, Is Citigroup Buying 
Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at 31 [hereinafter Citigroup Buying Trouble]; Richard A. 
Oppel & Patrick McGeehan, Citigroup Revamps Lending Unit To Avoid Abusive Practices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Citigroup Revamps].  Martin Eakes, the founder of 
a nonprofit community lender in North Carolina, is quoted as saying, “It’s simply unacceptable 
to have the largest bank in America take over the icon of predatory lending.”  Citigroup Buying 
Trouble, supra, at 31.  See also infra Part V.A (discussing the involvement of bank affiliates in 
predatory lending).
  In 1996, Associates had purchased Fleet Finance, another notorious predatory lender.  
See Tony Munroe, Fleet Unloads Finance Unit, BOSTON HERALD, July 2, 1996.  In 1993 and 
1994 Fleet Finance had paid over $100 million in settlement of allegations that it had engaged in 
predatory lending practices in Georgia.  Id.
5See Citigroup Revamps, supra note 4, at C1.
4premium credit insurance and “flipping,” or refinancing, loans to generate additional fees 
without benefit to the borrower.6  Employees of Associates were under intense pressure to sell 
credit life insurance, and a subsidiary had collected $900 million in revenue from credit 
insurance premiums over the five years prior to the Citigroup purchase, selling credit insurance 
on fifty-seven percent of its real estate loans one year.7  Consistent with its practice of “flipping” 
loans, Associates even refinanced zero-interest loans made through Habitat for Humanity.8
Citigroup promised reforms, but its consumer finance company, Citifinancial, which would 
eventually take over the Associates branches, planned to continue charging prepayment 
penalties, selling single premium credit life insurance, and requiring mandatory arbitration 
clauses in its loans.9
In March 2001, the FTC sued Associates, as well as Citigroup and Citifinancial as its 
successors, alleging that Associates had violated the Federal Trade Commission Act by engaging 
in deceptive practices to induce consumers to purchase credit insurance and to refinance existing 
home mortgage loans into new high interest rate loans with high fees.10  At the time, Citigroup 
stressed its commitment to resolve problems and implement changes in the former Associates 
6See Citigroup Buying Trouble, supra note 4, at 31.  See also supra Part I (describing the 
practice of predatory lending).
7See id.
8See id.
9See Citigroup Revamps, supra note 4, at C1.
10See Federal Trade Commission, News Release, Citigroup Settles FTC Charges Against 
the Associates: Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept. 20, 2002), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.htm [hereinafter FTC News Release].
5branches.11  In September 2002, Citigroup reached a settlement with the FTC, agreeing to pay 
$215 million to customers of Associates who had purchased credit insurance between December 
1, 1995, and November 30, 2000,12 the date on which Citigroup finalized its purchase of 
Associates.13  The settlement was made contingent on approval of the settlement of a class action 
in California providing for payment of an additional $25 million to consumers who refinanced 
with Associates during the same time period.14  The settlement was the largest ever reached by 
the FTC.15
Through the pendency of the FTC suit and after the settlement, Citigroup continued to 
insist that the problems were with the old Associates and that it was instituting reforms.16
However, in May 2004, the Federal Reserve ordered Citifinancial to pay a $70 million penalty 
for lending abuses which occurred in 2000 and 2001.17  The Fed asserted that Citifinancial made 
home equity loans without adequately determining the ability of borrowers to repay the loans.18
The penalty was the largest ever assessed by the Federal Reserve for violations of consumer 
11See Richard A Oppel, U.S. Suit Cites Citigroup Unit On Loan Deceit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
7, 2001, at A1.
12See FTC News Release, supra note 10.
13See Citigroup Closes Associates Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at C12.
14See FTC News Release, supra note 10.
15See id.
16Citigroup stopped doing business with about 20 percent of the brokers who brought 
business to Associates, Richard A Oppel, Citigroup Takes Action Against Brokers at Consumer 
Loan Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at C1, and agreed to stop selling single-premium credit 
insurance, opting instead to allow borrowers to pay monthly premiums, Patrick McGeehan, 
Citigroup Set to End Tactic on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at C1.
17See Timothy L. O’Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Fed Assesses Citigroup].
6lending laws.19  More recently, Citigroup disclosed that it had made hundreds of high-cost loans 
even after adopting a policy of no longer making high-cost loans.20  The New York attorney 
general is investigating whether Citigroup made high-cost loans to minority and other vulnerable 
homeowners who could qualify for lower cost loans.21
Citibank is not the only bank affiliated with a subprime lender accused of predatory 
lending abuses.  In 2002, Household International, an affiliate of HSBC Bank USA,22 agreed to 
pay $484 million to settle allegations by states that it had engaged in predatory lending 
practices.23  In addition, Bank of America, Bank One, Chase, Fleet Bank, and Wells Fargo, or 
affiliates of these banks, have all been sued based on allegations of predatory lending abuses.24
18See Fed Assesses Citigroup, supra note 17, at C1.
19See id.
20See Eric Dash, Citigroup Units Kept Making Loans That Violated Policy, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 4, 2005, at C9 [hereinafter Citigroup Violated Policy].  The high-cost loans covered by 
Citigroup’s policy are defined in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 
U.S.C. §1601 et seq. (2000).
21See Citigroup Violated Policy, supra note 20, at C1.
22See HOOVER’S IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, HSBC USA Inc. (Oct. 5, 2005), available 
at 2005 WLNR 16118527.
23See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-04-280, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY 
LENDING, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SPECIAL COMMITTEE 
ON AGING, U.S. SENATE 4 (2004) , available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
24See Comments of the National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Federation of 
America, National Association of Consumer Advocates, and U.S. Public Interest Research 
Group to Office of Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Docket No. 03-16 (Oct. 6, 2003), 
available at http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/test_and_comm/10_6_occ.shtml [hereinafter NCLC 
Comments]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s 
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,
23 ANN REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 315 (2004).
7Home ownership is still the American dream,25 and more Americans than ever are 
realizing that dream.26  Predatory lending practices and the foreclosures that result, however, 
undermine that dream.  The federal government has played and continues to play a significant 
role in promoting home ownership by supporting the home mortgage market, by offering tax 
incentives to homeowners, by attempting to make home mortgage financing more available and 
less expensive.27  Some of the government’s efforts to benefit home mortgage lenders and 
support the mortgage market, however, harm the very homeowners that they are ultimately 
intended to benefit.28  Recently, the federal government is thwarting the efforts of state 
legislators to protect homeowners in their states by preempting state statutes regulating predatory 
lending abuses.  Regulations preempt state predatory lending statutes applicable to national 
banks and savings associations (also called thrifts), and proposed legislation would preempt the 
statutes altogether.
25See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Homeownership is a 
National Priority, at http://www.hud.gov/initiatives/homeownership/index.cfm.  See also Joan 
Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326-27 (1998) (discussing the 
American obsession with homeownership).
26See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT & U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, 
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 13 (June 2000), available at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD/TREASURY JOINT 
REPORT] (stating that 67.1 percent of American families own a home).
27See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation 
of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 394 
(1994).
28Federal law encourages both borrowers and lenders to structure consumer debt as a 
home equity loan secured by the borrower’s home.  Furthermore, federal law preempts state 
usury laws and laws governing alternative mortgage transactions, thus permitting high interest 
rates and other unfair terms in home equity loans despite state law to the contrary.  Finally, 
federal bankruptcy law, which otherwise could give some relief to debtors, requires a debtor to 
pay a home equity loan in full on its original terms to avoid foreclosure.  See id. at 432-35.
8In this article I address the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federally-
supported lenders–banks, thrifts, and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.29  I conclude that preemption is not warranted, even for national banks and 
thrifts, and argue that banks, thrifts, and the GSEs should be part of the solution to the predatory 
lending problem by operating in the subprime mortgage market in compliance with both state 
and federal law.
In part I of this Article, I discuss the continuing problem of predatory lending.  Minority, 
elderly, and low-income homeowners are still being victimized by unscrupulous lenders, 
mortgage brokers, and contractors.  They pay too much for credit, obtain loans they cannot 
afford, and in some cases lose their homes.30
Part II explores the efforts of state and federal lawmakers and enforcers to address the 
predatory lending problem.  In 1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA),31 and many states have since enacted statutes designed to further 
protect their citizens from predatory lending abuses.32  Lenders, however, are opposed to state 
predatory lending statutes and have pressed federal lawmakers to preempt state law.
In Part III, I examine the possible causes of the predatory lending problem.  While the 
issues are complex and the precise causes hard to determine, changes over the last 30 years in the 
29Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately-owned government-sponsored entities that 
support the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing home mortgage loans.  See infra
Part V.B for a discussion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
30See infra Part I.
31Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1648 (2000)).
32See infra Part II.B.
9operation of the mortgage market for both prime and subprime loans have been a major 
contributing factor.  While these changes have served the prime market well, they have increased 
the likelihood that subprime borrowers will be victimized.  Investors in home mortgages can 
purchase predatory loans, turning a blind eye to dishonest originators, and can hide under the 
holder in due course doctrine and the securitization process to avoid loss and liability.  A major 
increase in the availability of subprime credit has opened the door to predatory lenders, and 
market failures have kept honest subprime lenders from driving the dishonest ones out of the 
market.  Finally, federal preemption of state consumer protection measures has prevented states 
from responding to the full extent possible.
Part IV discusses recent developments in the federal preemption of state predatory 
lending laws as well as the validity of regulatory attempts at preemption.  In January 2004 the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced that federal banking law preempts 
state predatory lending statutes as applied to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.33
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) had previously issued a similar determination earlier 
with respect to federal savings associations.34 In addition, a bill currently before Congress would 
preempt state predatory lending statutes altogether.35
In Part V, I discuss the involvement of federally-supported lenders–banks, thrifts, and 
government sponsored enterprises--in the subprime and predatory lending markets.  Banks and 
thrifts and the GSEs have taken vastly different approaches to the subprime mortgage market and 
33See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
34See infra notes 258-73 and accompanying text.
35See infra Part IV.B.
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the predatory lending problem.  Federal banks and thrifts are involved in the subprime mortgage 
market and in some cases make or profit indirectly from predatory loans.  Banks and thrifts have 
sought and obtained protection from state predatory lending initiatives through federal 
preemption.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, on the other hand, have become increasingly 
involved in the purchase and securitization of subprime loans while adhering to guidelines 
designed to prevent their purchase of predatory loans.  Both have successfully operated under the
patchwork of state mortgage law for many years and the more recent patchwork of predatory 
lending laws emerging in an increasing majority of the states.
In Part VI, I argue that the federal government should not preempt state predatory lending 
law.  Both real estate finance and consumer protection have traditionally been areas governed by 
state rather than federal law.  In recent years when the federal government has intervened in 
these areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a minimum standard for 
consumer protection rather than preempting the field of regulation.  When state governments 
regulate, they can be more responsive to the needs of their citizens and can be innovative in 
trying new solutions.  State enforcers are more likely to prosecute small actors in predatory 
lending that federal enforcers may ignore.
I assert that varying state laws are not as onerous on lenders as they may claim.  Since 
subprime loans tend to be originated by local mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, the 
originators can comply with local law, and investors can police their originators and purchase 
only from those that do comply with local law.  The states already have varying laws governing 
real estate finance, so adding additional requirements is only a matter of revising forms and 
standards that already differ from state to state.  Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can 
11
further their regulatory goals of leading the market in loans to low and moderate-income families 
and in low and moderate-income neighborhoods by participating in the subprime market to a 
greater extent and by setting standards for compliance with each state’s law.
Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far been unsuccessful.  
As a result, state legislatures have reacted to the problem by enacting statutes aimed at protecting 
consumers in their states.  This article argues that the federal government should not tie the 
hands of state legislatures and state attorneys general who are trying to combat mortgage lending 
abuses because predatory lending is still a problem.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING
Predatory lending is alive and well,36 as the lawyers in the trenches is legal aid offices 
across the country can attest.  Despite federal and state statutory measures aimed directly at 
curbing the problem, homeowners are still victimized.  In fact, the incidence of predatory lending 
has increased since 1994 when Congress enacted HOEPA.37
36See GAO Report, supra note 23, at 23-25; HUD/ TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 
26, at 22.  In March of 2000, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Andrew Cuomo, 
formed the National Task Force on Predatory Lending.  Id. at 13-14.  Task force members 
included “representatives of consumer advocacy groups; industry trade associations representing 
mortgage lenders, brokers, and appraisers; local officials; and academics.”  Id. at 14.  
Recommendations in the HUD/Treasury Joint Report are based in significant part on information 
gathered by the task force.  Id. at 13.
37See Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing Before the 
Subcomms. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community 
Opportunity of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 1 (2005), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=389&comm=3   
[hereinafter Hearing on Legislative Solutions] (statement of Martin Eakes, CEO, Self-Help and 
the Center for Responsible Lending) (“As the subprime mortgage market has boomed, climbing 
from $35 billion to $530 billion in the decade through last year, so to have abusive loans, which 
12
Predatory lending must be distinguished from subprime lending.  Subprime loans are 
loans with a higher risk of default because of the credit characteristics of the borrowers.38
Borrowers may be a higher credit risk because of previous delinquencies, foreclosures, or 
bankruptcies, their debt-to-income ratios, or other factors.39   Because of the greater risk of 
default by these borrowers, subprime loans carry higher interest rates than prime loans.40  Even 
within the subprime market, interest rates vary according to risk.41  Subprime loans are classified 
according to risk as A- (lowest risk), B, C, or D (highest risk),42 with interest rates varying from 
about half a point to as much as four points above prime rates.43
are concentrated in this market.”); Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 398 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings 
on Predatory Mortgage Lending] (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN 
Housing Corp.); 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“With this increase in subprime lending 
there has also been an increase in reports of “predatory lending.”).
38See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, & Office of Thrift Supervision, 
Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs 2 (2001) [hereinafter Expanded Guidance]; 
Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 311 (statement of John A. Courson, 
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n), 345-46 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition).
39Expanded Guidance, supra note 38, at 2-3.
40See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 27.
41See id. at 28.
42Id. at 33.
These grades are not well defined across the industry, but an “A-minus” borrower 
may have good credit generally but has had some minor payment delinquencies in 
the past year.  A “C” or “D” borrower may have a marginal or poor credit history 
, including multiple payment delinquencies in the past year or past bankruptcies.
Id. at 33-34.  Prime loans are classified as A loans.  Id. at 33.
43Id. at 28.  Underwriting standards are not uniform among subprime lenders.  JOHN C. 
WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS 
WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 13, 34 (Hudson Institute 1997).  Weicher’s report states:
13
Most subprime lenders provide a valuable service by giving borrowers access to credit to 
buy homes, make home improvements, or borrow against the equity in their homes for other 
purposes.44  In the past, almost all subprime loans were either home equity loans or home 
improvement loans, but in recent years, subprime lenders have also entered the purchase money 
loan market.45  Most subprime loans, however, are still made for the purposes of refinancing, 
debt consolidation, or general consumer credit.46  Subprime loans used to be primarily second 
lien loans, but today they are predominantly first lien loans.47  While most subprime loans are not 
predatory, predatory loans are almost always subprime.48
In sharp contrast to the prime mortgage market, there are no generally 
accepted underwriting guidelines for the subprime home equity lenders.  
Individual firms set their own guidelines.  They typically take the same factors 
into consideration but set different criteria to qualify for a given credit grade.  
Hence, one firm’s B loans may look like another’s C loans.  Underwriting appears 
to be an art rather than a science.   . . .
Id. at 13.
44HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 2-3.
45See id. at 30.
46Id.; WEICHER, supra note 43, at 31.
47See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 30, 47.  Most home mortgage 
loans are not subject to state usury limitations because federal law preempts state usury 
limitations for “federally-related” loans secured by a first lien on residential real property in most 
states.  See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
48See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 4; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, 
at 2; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 311-12 (statement of John A. 
Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n), 346 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition), 398 (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing 
Corp.).
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Predatory loans are characterized by high interest rates and points that exceed the amount 
necessary to cover the lender’s risk,49 excessive fees and closing costs that are usually financed 
as part of the loan,50 frequent refinancing or “loan flipping” with additional points and fees,51
lending based on home equity without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay,52 and outright 
fraud.53  Borrowers are often required to refinance low interest rate purchase money loans as part 
49See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, 
at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment); Hearings 
on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 346 (statement of David Berrenbaum, 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition), 296 (statement of Esther Canja, President, 
AARP).  Homeowners may pay interest rates as high as 29 percent per annum.  See, e.g., 
Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 5-6 (statement of Martina Guilfoil, Executive 
Director, Inglewood Neighborhood Housing).  They may pay points totaling as much as 33 
percent of the amount financed.  See Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage 
Lending Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending:  Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (letter from 
Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Att’y, St. Ambrose Legal Servs., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. 
(Feb. 17, 1993)) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending].
50See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, 
at 2, 21; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 318 (statement of Irv 
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n); Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing Before the House Banking and Financial Services 
Comm., 106th Cong. 12 (2000) [hereinafter called Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices] 
(statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
51See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, 
at 2, 21; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, 323-24 (statement of Irv 
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n), 295 (statement of Judith A. Kennedy, Nat’l Ass’n of Affordable Housing Lenders); 
Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 50, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, 
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
52See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, 
at 2, 22; Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board 
Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
53See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, 
at 2, 22; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, 233 (statement of Jeffrey 
Zeltzer, National Home Equity Mortgage Association), 296 (statement of Esther Canja, 
President, AARP), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n); Hearing on 
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of the new higher interest rate home equity loan.54  When a borrower has difficulty making 
payments on the predatory loan, the lender may encourage refinancing of the debt with a larger 
loan carrying a higher interest rate and requiring higher monthly payments and payment of 
additional points and closing costs.55  Borrowers rarely obtain any benefit from a loan flip other 
than postponing a foreclosure, and they end up owing more after having paid additional points 
and fees to the same or another predatory lender.   Predatory loans may also have other unfair 
terms such as high prepayment fees, balloon payments, exorbitant late charges, and single 
premium credit insurance.56  Fraudulent practices include falsifying loan applications, forging 
borrowers signatures, changing loan terms at closing, misrepresenting loan terms, physically 
obscuring key terms, and having borrowers sign documents with key terms left blank.57  In some 
cases, lenders make the loans without regard to the borrowers’ ability to repay, relying instead on 
Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 50, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary 
for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
54 See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, 318 (statement of Irv 
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, 
at 447 (letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Att’y, St. Ambrose Legal Servs., to Sen. Donald 
W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993)).  For example, John Thomas, a disabled African American man, 
was required to refinance his 10.5 percent first mortgage at an interest rate of 11.99 percent in 
order to get a second lien loan at an interest rate of 23.9 percent.  See Hearing on Legislative 
Solutions, supra note 37, 2-3 (statement of Martina Guilfoil, Executive Director, Inglewood 
Neighborhood Housing).
55See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 21.
56See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 398 (statement of 
Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.), 347 (statement of David Berenbaum, 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
57See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 347 (statement of 
David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); 1993 Hearings on Problems 
in Lending, supra note 49, at 309 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y General, 
Commonwealth of Mass.).
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the borrower’s equity in the home to secure the loan,58 which is an underwriting practice that is 
not appropriate for home mortgage lending.
The targets of predatory lenders are most often minorities, the elderly, and the inner-city 
and rural poor.59  Borrowers from predatory lenders usually have substantial equity in their 
homes due to rising real estate values or to reduction of purchase money debt, but are short on 
cash because of their low or fixed incomes.60  They may need money to make home repairs or 
improvements, to pay for necessities such as medical care, or to consolidate household debts.61
58See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 318 (statement of Irv 
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 346 (statement of David Berenbaum, National 
Community Reinvestment Coalition). In fact, cases have been documented in which monthly 
payments on a home equity loan exceeded the borrower’s monthly income. See, e.g., 1993 
Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 260 (statement of Terry Drent, Ann Arbor 
Community Dev. Dep’t) (discussing monthly payments of $250 required of a borrower with a 
monthly income of $220), 292 (statement of Eva Davis, Resident, San Francisco) (discussing 
approximate monthly payments of $2,000 required of a borrower with a monthly income of 
under $1,100); Gary Chafetz & Peter S. Canellos, Elderly Poor Losing Homes in Loan Scam: 
Unregulated Lenders Offer High Rates, Risks, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1991, at 1, 6 (discussing 
monthly payments of $2,062 required of a borrower with a monthly income of about $800).
59See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 37, at 12 (statement of Gary 
Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury), 20 (statement of Donna 
Tanoue, Chairwoman, FDIC); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 254 
(statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y General, Commonwealth of Mass.), 257 (statement of 
Kathleen Keest, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.).
60See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT, CREDIT ENHANCEMENT, AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1993, S. Rep. 
No. 169, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1993).
61See id.; 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 449 (letter from 
William E. Morris, Director of Litig., S. Ariz. Legal Aid, to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 18, 
1993)).
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The elderly are particularly vulnerable because they typically have a great deal of equity in 
homes that they have owned for many years and because they are likely to be on fixed incomes.62
Perpetrators of predatory lending abuses include lenders, mortgage brokers, and home 
improvement contractors.63  These parties seek out particularly vulnerable homeowners on whom 
to prey.64  Upon finding a likely prospect, a lender, broker, or contractor may use high pressure 
tactics or fraud to induce the homeowner to enter into an abusive loan transaction.65
Predatory lending can be tremendously profitable for perpetrators of abuses.  Mortgage 
brokers and lenders who originate loans collect large up-front fees when the loan is made.  When 
the homeowner makes payments, the lender reaps an enormous profit based on the high interest 
rates.  If the homeowner cannot pay, the lender forecloses and takes any equity in the house.66
62See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 296-97 (statement of 
Esther Canja, President, AARP); HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 72;  ROBERT 
J. HOBBS ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER PROBLEMS WITH HOME 
EQUITY SCAMS, SECOND MORGAGES, AND HOME EQUITY LINES OF CREDIT 9 (Am. Ass’n of 
Retired Persons 1989).
63See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 444 (statement of 
Consumer Bankers Ass’n); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 50, at 12 
(statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
64See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 17-18 (statement of 
Leroy Williams, private citizen).  They may check foreclosure notices to find financially 
troubled homeowners or may cruise certain neighborhoods looking for homes in need of repair.  
See Mike Hudson, Stealing Home: How the Government and Big Banks Help Second-Mortgage 
Companies Prey on the Poor, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1476, 1479 (1993).
65See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 309 (statement of Scott 
Harshbarger, Att’y General, Commonwealth of Mass.).
66See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 318 (statement of Irv 
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services).
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Even if the borrower prepays the loan by refinancing, the lender profits if the loan has a 
prepayment penalty.67
The effects of predatory lending are devastating for the individuals who are victims and 
for their neighborhoods.  At best, the victims of predatory lenders end up paying too much in 
fees and interest for their loans.  The worst case scenario is that they lose their homes to 
foreclosure.  A dramatic increase in foreclosures in inner-city neighbors has followed the 
increase in subprime lending in recent years.68  For individuals and families, the loss of a home 
to foreclosure is devastating, both financially and psychologically.69  Foreclosures caused by 
predatory lending have a negative impact on neighborhoods as well since the impact of 
foreclosures may be concentrated in low-income areas.70  Vacant homes caused by foreclosures 
can cause a decrease property values and an increase in crime that can destabilize at-risk 
67See id.  Prepayment penalties are much more common in subprime loans than in prime 
loans.
68HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 24.  For example, foreclosures of 
homes in Baltimore grew from 1,900 in 1995 to more than 5,000 in 1999.  Id.
69Id; Forrester, supra note 27, at 385-86.  Financial issues include loss of equity in the 
home and in some states the possibility of a deficiency judgment.  See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., 
Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms 
of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959, 966-67 (1993).  Psychological issues include mental illness, 
suicide, crime, family problems, sadness, depression, sleep loss, and anger.  See Mortgage 
Foreclosures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation 
and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
276 (1983) (statement of John J. Sheehan, Director of Legis., United Steelworkers of Am.); Marc 
Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE 
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 359-61 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
70HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 25.
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neighborhoods.71  Therefore, predatory lending has an impact beyond the homeowners who 
obtain predatory loans.
Problems caused by predatory lenders first caught the attention of lawmakers over a 
decade ago.72  However, predatory lending has difficult to regulate in part because it is difficult
to define.73  Some practices, such as fraud, are clearly illegal.  Other predatory lending practices 
have been perfectly legal, and some individual practices are legitimate under certain 
circumstances.74  As the incidence of predatory lending has continued to increase, lawmakers 
have continued to grapple with the problem. 
II. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
A. Federal Response to Predatory Lending
1. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act and Regulation Z
In 1994 in response to problems stemming from predatory lending, Congress enacted the 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.75  HOEPA defines certain home mortgage loans as 
“high-cost” loans and, with respect to high-cost loans, requires particular disclosures and 
71Id. See also 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 254 (statement 
of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y General, Commonwealth of Mass.) (Predatory lending practices 
targeting low-income neighborhoods may result in “the social fabric of many inner-city urban 
neighborhoods [being] torn apart and communities destablized.”)
72See generally 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49. 
73See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 17.
74For example, a prepayment penalty could be appropriate in a prime mortgage loan if a 
borrower makes an informed decision to include this provision in order to obtain a lower interest 
rate.
75Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1648 (2000)).
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prohibits designated unfair terms.76  The Act specifically excludes from its application purchase 
money mortgages, reverse mortgages, and home equity lines of credit,77 so it applies to refinance 
loans and to second lien loans that are not lines of credit.  HOEPA initially defined high-cost 
home mortgage loans as those with an APR more than ten points above Treasury bill rates or 
with points and fees exceeding the greater of eight percent of the loan amount or $400, but the 
Act provided for adjustment by the Federal Reserve Board after two years.78  HOEPA requires 
that lenders make the required disclosures to a homeowner three days before the consummation 
of the loan and prohibits the lender from changing the terms of the loan without giving new 
disclosures.79  The Act prohibits prepayment penalties under certain circumstances,80 an 
increased interest rate on default,81 balloon payments to be made less than five years after the 
closing of the loan,82 and negative amortization83 in high-cost loans.  In addition, HOEPA 
prohibits lenders from engaging “in a pattern or practice” of making high-cost loans without 
regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.84  HOEPA  provides for civil liability for non-
compliance85 and for enforcement by state attorney generals.86
7615 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.
7715 U.S.C. § 1603(i), (w), (aa), (bb).
7815 U.S.C. § 1603(aa).  The Federal Reserve Board adjusted the trigger rate in 2002.  
See infra notes 95-98.
79See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a), (b).
80Id. § 1639(c).
81Id. § 1639(d).
82Id. § 1639(e).
83Id. § 1639(f).
84Id. § 1639(h).
85See id. § 1640.
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HOEPA eliminates holder-in-due-course status for purchasers of HOEPA covered 
loans.87  As a result, assignees of HOEPA loans are subject to all claims and defenses that the 
homeowner could have asserted against the originator.88   HOEPA does, however, limit the 
liability of assignees to the total amount of the debt paid and remaining unpaid.89  In addition, 
HOEPA provides a safe harbor for assignees who can demonstrate that “a reasonable person 
exercising ordinary due diligence, could not determine . . . that the mortgage was [a HOEPA 
covered loan].”90
Consumer advocates have criticized HOEPA as being ineffective in part because it is not 
inclusive enough.91  First, very few subprime loans exceed the interest rate threshold.92  In fact, 
lenders may keep interest rates just below the HOEPA trigger in order to avoid the requirements 
of the Act.  Secondly, the fee trigger excludes reasonable fees paid to third parties93 as well as 
fees paid by someone other than the borrower.94  As a result, the trigger does not include 
potentially abusive fees such as single premium credit insurance and yield spread premiums paid 
86See id. § 1640(e).
87See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1); Bryant v. Mortgage Capital Resource Corp., 197 F.Supp.2d 
1357 (2002).  See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the holder in due course doctrine.
8815 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).
89Id. at 1641(d)(2).
90Id. at 1641(d)(1).
91See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 85; Hearing on Legislative 
Solutions, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition).
92See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 85.
9315 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4).
94See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 85.
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to a mortgage broker.  Finally, HOEPA does not apply to high cost purchase money loans, 
reverse mortgages or home equity lines of credit.
In response to criticism, the Federal Reserve Board revised regulations under HOEPA 
effective October 2002.95  The new Reg Z lowers the trigger for first lien loans to eight points 
above Treasury bill rates and includes premiums for credit insurance paid at closing in the fee 
trigger.96  In addition, the rule prohibits a creditor from refinancing a high cost mortgage within 
twelve months of closing unless the refinancing is in the “borrower’s best interest.”97  This 
provision was intended to address the problem of loan flipping.98  Despite the new regulations, 
consumer advocates claim that HOEPA is still not effective.99
2. FTC Enforcement Actions
The Federal Trade Commission has filed enforcement actions against lenders engaged in 
predatory lending activities under HOEPA and other federal statutes.100  Between 1998 and 
9566 Fed. Reg. 65604 (2001).
9612 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i).
9712 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1)(iv).
9866 Fed. Reg. 65604-1, at 65617.
99See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, 
Board Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); Protecting Homeowners:
Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomms. 
on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community Opportunity of the 
House Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 11 (2003), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/110503ms.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Protecting 
Homeowners] (testimony of Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law 
Center) (“Unfortunately it is clear that HOEPA has not stopped predatory lending.  Indeed, the 
problem has only grown worse in the eight years since it has become effective.”)
100Other federal statutes the FTC has used in enforcement actions include the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 
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2003, the FTC filed 19 complaints and reached settlements in most of those cases.101  Most of the 
settlements required compensation to consumers and an agreement by the lender to stop certain 
practices.  Some of the most notable settlements include the settlement reached with Citigroup102
and a $60 million settlement with First Alliance Mortgage Company.103  The FTC and other 
federal agencies focus their efforts on “cases that will have the most impact, such as those that 
may result in large settlements to consumers or that will have some deterrent value by gaining 
national exposure.”104  Therefore, the FTC’s enforcement actions have been against some of the 
largest and worst offenders.
B. States’ Response to Predatory Lending
More than thirty states have adopted statutory or regulatory schemes designed to address 
the predatory lending problem.105   Many of the state statutes are similar to HOEPA in that 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 
U.S.C. § 2603 (2000), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), § 1692 (2000).
101See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Subprime Lending cases (since 1998), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/subprimelendingcases.htm; GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 
37, Appendix I.  The Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development were involved in some of the cases.  Id.  These cases involved violations of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §1691 (2000), and the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
102See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
103See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 37.
104Id. at 40.
105See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791 (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 7-6A-1 to 7-6A-13 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
46:10B-24 to 46:10B-35 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. BANKING § 6-l (McKinney Supp. 2005); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.25 - 1349.37 (LexisNexis 2002); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
456.501 - 456.524 (West Supp. 2005).  See also Butera & Andrews, 2005 Detailed Status 
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statutory restrictions are triggered by loans with interest rates or fees in excess of set levels.106
Some have statutes with triggers that are lower than HOEPA’s,107 while others are the same.108
Some of the statutes have multiple triggers with more stringent requirements for loans with 
higher levels of interest rates and/or fees.109  Most of the statutes have additional restrictions or 
requirements beyond HOEPA’s for loans that are covered.110  Statutes in some states have 
increased the regulation and licensing requirements of originators and brokers.111
Summary Chart of State and Local Predatory Lending Legislation, at http://www.butera-
andrews.com/state-local/index.html  (last updated Aug. 5, 2005).
In addition, some local governments have adopted ordinances prohibiting predatory 
lending practices.  See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUNI. CODE § 5.33 (2001); LOS ANGELES, CAL., 
MUNI. CODE ch. 16 (2003); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 372-02 (Mar. 4, 2002); Dayton, Ohio, 
Ordinance 29990-01 (July 11, 2001); NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, LOCAL LAW 36 § 6-128 
(2002); Summit County, Ohio, Ordinance 2004-386, 2004-618 (Aug. 16, 2004).  However, some 
of these ordinances have been held to be preempted by state law.  See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. 
City of Oakland, 34 Cal.4th 1239, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 (2005) (holding that the Oakland 
ordinance is preempted by California’s predatory lending statute); Dayton v. State, 157 Ohio 
App.3d 736, 813 N.E.2d 707 (2004) (holding that the Dayton ordinance by Ohio’s predatory 
lending statute); Stephen F.J. Ornstein, et al., Local Anti-Predatory Lending Litigation Update, 
59 CONS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 153 (2005).  Other ordinances are subject to ongoing litigation to 
determine whether they are preempted by state law.  Id. at 156.
106See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791; GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D); 
63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 456.503.  See also GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 58.
107See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(6)(b); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 46:10B-24.
108See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 343.201 
(Vernon 2001).
109See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24.  See also Baher Azmy & David Reiss, 
Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 
2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645, 674 -76 (2004) (discussing the New Jersey Statute).
110See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(6)(b); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 46:10B-26.
111See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 62.
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North Carolina was the first state to enact a comprehensive predatory lending statute in 
1999.112  Like HOEPA, the North Carolina statute defines “high-cost” loans, but the trigger is set 
lower than HOEPA for points and fees.113  For these high-cost loans, the statute prohibits call 
provisions giving a lender discretion to accelerate,114 balloon payments,115 negative 
amortization,116 increased interest rate upon default,117 financing of any points or fees or charges 
payable to a third party (which includes yield spread premiums),118 and making a loan without 
regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.119  In addition, the statute prohibits the financing of 
insurance premiums and “flipping” for all consumer home loans.120  Therefore, the statute goes 
beyond HOEPA in offering protection to North Carolina homeowners because it covers more 
loans and imposes more stringent restrictions.
Consumer advocates cite the North Carolina statute as a success,121 and a number of 
states have followed the lead of North Carolina in adopting statutes with lower triggers and more 
112Act to Prohibit Predatory Lending, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 24-1.1A - 10.2 (2003)).
113The trigger for points and fees is 5% of the loan amount, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
1.1E(a)(6)(b), rather than 8% of the loan amount set by HOEPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)(B)(i).  
The trigger for APR is the same as HOEPA’s at 8% above Treasury bill rates.  N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 24-1.1E(a)(2). 
114N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(1).
115Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(2).
116Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(3).
117Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(4).
118Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(3).
119Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(2).
120Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(4).
121See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, 
CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
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prohibitions than HOEPA.122  Despite the additional protection that North Carolina law gives to 
subprime borrowers, the subprime market has grown in North Carolina at a rate similar to states 
without a similar statute.123  Every significant subprime lender that made loans in 1999 before 
the statute became effective continued to do business in North Carolina in 2000 after the statute 
was effective.124  North Carolina had 15% more than the national average of subprime loans per 
capita in 2000.125
Georgia’s statute, the Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA),126 on the other hand, initially 
caused concern until it was quickly amended by the Georgia legislature.127  The statute, in its 
original form, was the strongest in the nation.  It created three categories of loans: “home loans,” 
“covered home loans,” and “high-cost home loans.”128  While the “home loan” category included 
most home mortgage loans,129 the other two categories were defined based on a loan’s annual 
percentage rate or on points and fees charged.130  The statute created a different set of restrictions 
for each of the three categories.  Some restrictions, including limits on late fees and a prohibition 
122See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 24-9-4-1 to 24-9-4-12 (West Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
46:10B-24, 26 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. BANKING § 6-l (McKinney Supp. 2005).
123See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, 
CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
124See Center for Responsible Lending, Support H.R. 1182, CRL Policy Brief No. 10 
(Mar. 10, 2005) available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pkfs/pb010-MillerWattFrank-0305.pdf.
125Id. at 2.
126GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A (2004).
127S.B. 53, 147th Gen. Assme., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003).
128GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(6), (8), (9), (19) (Supp. 2002) (amended 2003).
129Id. §7-6A-2(9).
130Id. §7-6A-2(6), (8), (19).
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on financing of credit life insurance, applied to all home loans.131  A restriction on flipping 
applied to covered home loans.132  Most of the restrictions, including limits on prepayment fees, 
a prohibition on negative amortization, and credit counseling requirements, applied only to high-
cost home loans.133  Finally, purchasers of high-cost home loans were made “subject to all 
affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to the loan that the borrower could assert 
against the original creditor . . . .”134
After the Georgia legislature enacted the GFLA, rating agencies responded by refusing to 
rate mortgage backed securities secured by pools of residential loans containing any loans 
originated in Georgia after the effective date of the statute.135  One of the primary concerns of the 
rating agencies and lenders was that assignees would have unlimited liability for affirmative 
claims that the borrower could assert against the originator.  In response, the Georgia legislature 
amended the assignee liability provision of the GFLA to add a safe harbor for lenders who 
exercise reasonable due diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans and to limit the 
131See id. § 7-6A-3.
132See id. § 7-6A-4.
133See id. § 7-6A-5.
134Id. § 7-6A-6.
135See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in 
RMBS Pools, Considers Impact to Other Predatory Lending Legislation (Feb. 5, 2003), available 
at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html; Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, 
Inc. Moody’s Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential Mortgages in 
Securitizations (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html; 
Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Standard and Poor’s to Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act 
Loans (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html.
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liability of those lenders who do not fit within the safe harbor.136  The rating agencies 
subsequently announced that they would again rate pools with Georgia loans.137
Likewise, other states have enacted statutes with assignee liability provisions similar to 
the one in the amended Georgia statute.138  These states also include a safe harbor for lenders 
who exercise reasonable due diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans.139
Not surprisingly, lender and mortgage broker advocates have been critical of state 
predatory lending laws.140  They claim that state regulations are too burdensome on honest 
subprime lenders,141 that compliance with the patchwork of state laws is too costly,142 and that 
state laws will have a negative affect on the availability of subprime credit.143  Lender groups 
have fought state laws at the state level and have at the federal level proposed that federal law 
136See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6 (2003).  The legislature also amended the GFLA  to 
eliminate the “covered home loan” category altogether.  See id. § 7-6A-2.
137See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 109, at 68.
138See, e.g.., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a) (Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-
24 (West Supp. 2005).
139See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24.
140See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, 
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, 
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage 
Brokers).
141See id. at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable 
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of 
Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
142See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable 
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of 
Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
143See id. at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable 
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of 
Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
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should preempt state laws.  Consumer groups on the other hand applaud the efforts of state 
legislatures to combat predatory lending abuses.
III. CAUSES OF PREDATORY LENDING
To solve the problem of predatory lending, it is necessary to ascertain is causes, and a 
number of commentators have suggested possible causes.144  Certainly there are multiple factors 
that contribute to the problem.  Some of the factors that have led to the proliferation of mortgage 
lending abuses are a result of changes in the mortgage market that have occurred over the past 
twenty to thirty years.
A. Changes in the Mortgage Market
Before the mid-1970's most prime mortgage loans were made by depository institutions 
using deposits to fund the loans.145  Home mortgage loans were made primarily by thrifts to local 
borrowers using savings deposits of local depositors.146  The thrift would handle all aspects of 
144See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and 
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV 503, 507 (2002); Kathleen C. Engel 
& Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2002);  Forrester, supra note 27, at 419; Cathy Lesser Mansfield, 
The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury 
Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S. CAR. L. REV. 473.
145In the late 1970s savings and loans made half to as much as 60% of home mortgage 
loans.  See Mansfield, supra note 144, at 498 n.155 (citing 125 CONG. REC. 29,930 (1979) 
(statement of Sen. Morgan) (stating that savings and loans made about 60% of all home 
mortgage loans up to 1979) and David F. Seiders, Recent Developments in Mortgage and 
Housing Markets, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 173, 180 (1979) (finding that in 1978 savings and loans 
made half of all home mortgage loans)).
146See, e.g., IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (1946).  When depositors threaten a “run on the 
bank,” Jimmy Stewart, as George Bailey, says:
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the transaction including the origination of the loan,147 the funding of the loan from it own 
capital in the form of deposits, and the servicing of the loan throughout its life.148  The loan 
would be held by the local savings and loan until it was paid off or until a default resulted in 
foreclosure.  Thus, the savings and loan had a long-term relationship with the borrower.
The subprime mortgage market was dominated by finance companies that originated 
loans using funds obtained through commercial paper, bonds, bank lines of credit, and both long-
term and short-term debt.149  The finance companies held the loans they originated in portfolio150
or used the loans to secure their own debt.  The finance company that made a loan thus 
performed the origination, servicing, and ownership functions associated with the loans they 
made.151  In the past, subprime loans made up a very small portion of the home mortgage 
market,152 and most subprime loans were second lien loans.153
You’re thinkin’ of this place all wrong as if I had the money back in a safe.  The 
money’s not here.  Why, your money’s in Joe’s house, that’s right next to yours, 
and in the Kennedy house and Mrs. Maplin’s house and a hundred others.  You’re 
lending them the money to build, and then they’re going to pay it back to you as 
best they can.
Id.
147Origination includes taking a loan application, checking the credit and employment of 
the borrower, obtaining an appraisal of the property, and seeing that loan documents are prepared 
and executed.  GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 892 (6th ed. 2003).
148Servicing includes the collection of payments, holding tax and insurance escrow 
accounts, paying taxes and insurance premiums from escrow accounts, and handling defaults.  
Id. at 479.
149HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 40.
150Id.
151Home improvement contractors were often involved in the origination of home 
improvement loans made by finance companies.  Sometimes the contractor originated loans and 
sold them to a finance company, and sometimes the contractor referred loans to the finance 
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Today both the prime and subprime mortgage markets operate differently with the 
functions of origination, servicing and ownership generally being performed by different parties.  
Capital markets are the source of most mortgage loan funds.  Fewer loans are originated by 
depository institutions, and more are originated by mortgage and finance companies or through 
mortgage brokers.154  Mortgage companies are in the business of originating mortgage loans for 
sale to investors or to be securitized.  Mortgage companies do not require a large amount of 
capital available for investment, since they typically hold mortgages only until a sufficient 
number of mortgages can be pooled and sold to an investor or securitized.155  The mortgage 
company often borrows money to fund the loans through a warehouse line of credit, which the 
company draws down as loans are made and repays when a package of loans is sold.156
Sometimes the mortgage company or other originator retains the servicing function, but more 
often than not a company other than the originating lender will be servicing the loan.157
company.  Abuses in home improvement loans led to the adoption of the FTC’s Holder in Due 
Course Rule in 1976.  See Julia P. Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for 
Home Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (1996).
152See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 29.  In 1983, subprime loans 
made up only 1.4% of the home mortgage market.  See Fred Faust, Minorities Likely to Pay 
More for Loans, Report Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22, 1999, at C8.  Even in 1994, 
subprime originations accounted for less than 5% of all mortgage originations.  HUD/TREASURY 
JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 29.
153HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 30.
154See Mansfield, supra note 144, at 526; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, 
at 39.
155See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
156See infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of warehouse lines of 
credit.
157See Michael G. Jacobides, Mortgage Banking Unbundling: Structure, Automation and 
Profit, 61 MORTGAGE BANKING 28 (Jan. 1, 2001), available at 2001 WLNR 4301659.
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Often the initial contact with a borrower is not even made by the originator of the loan 
but by a mortgage broker.  Mortgage brokers may be involved in more than half of all home 
mortgage loan originations according to the National Association of Mortgage Brokers.158
Brokers are paid a fee by the borrower or the lender and in some cases perform many of the 
origination functions other than underwriting and the initial funding.  Brokers also may be paid a 
yield spread premium if the broker can induce the borrower to borrow at a rate above the rate 
offered by the lender for a particular loan.159
Some investors in loan pools purchase and hold them directly, but more frequently today 
the loans are securitized with investors buying securities backed by the pool of loans.  
Securitization of home mortgage loans began in the prime mortgage market in the 1970s with 
Ginnie Mae guaranteeing securities backed by mortgage loans160 and Freddie Mac issuing 
mortgage backed securities.161  The private sector first became significantly involved in 
securitization in the late 1970s after rating agencies began rating mortgage backed securities not 
expressly or impliedly backed by the federal government.162  By the 1980s a significant portion 
158See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 37, at 683 (statement of the 
National Home Equity Mortgage Association); HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 
39.  See also WEICHER, supra note 43, at 32 (stating that brokers originated 36 percent of 
subprime mortgage loans in 1996).
159HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 40.
160See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:2 (3rd ed. 2002).  Ginnie Mae is a government agency in the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development.  See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
161See infra note 367 and accompanying text.
162Eggert, supra note 144, at 537; Comm. On Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of the 
Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 
537 (1995).
33
of mortgage loans were securitized.  Securitization did not take hold in the subprime mortgage 
market until the 1990s, but is now a major factor in the subprime mortgage market.163
A private lender that wants to securitize a pool of mortgage loans will typically create a 
special purpose corporation, trust or other entity, called a special purpose vehicle or SPV.164  The 
SPV is created to be “bankruptcy remote” so that creditors of the lender will not have claims 
against the SPV.165  The SPV issues the securities to raise cash to purchase the loan pool from 
the lender.166  Investors in the securities need only be concerned with the cash flow coming from 
the mortgage loans and not with the originating lender’s financial condition.167  Because a 
security represents a small interest in a large pool of mortgage loans, the risk of default on any 
one mortgage loan is shared among the holders of the securities.   The securities are typically 
rated by one of the rating agencies,168 and may have a third party credit enhancement such as a 
guaranty, surety bond, or bank letter of credit.169  Another type of credit enhancement involves 
the issuance of subordinated securities to investors willing to accept additional repayment 
163In 1994, 32% of subprime loans were securitized.  By 1998, the rate was 55% before it 
dropped back to 37% in 1999.  HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 41.  See also
Glenn B. Canner, et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 241, 
249 (1998) (“Most subprime lenders place heavy reliance on securitization of their loans to fund 
their operations.”).
164See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L., BUS. & 
FIN. 133, 134 (1994).
165See id. at 135-36; SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 1:1.
166SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 1:1.
167Schwarcz, supra note 164, at 136.
168Id.  The most well-known rating agencies are Standard & Poor’s Rating Group 
(“S&P”), Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) and Fitch, Inc. (“Fitch”).  See
SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 1:2 n.13.
169See id. § 2:3.
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risks.170  With credit enhancements, securities backed by subprime loans can achieve investment 
grade status.171  As a result, securitization has funneled additional funds into the subprime 
mortgage market.
B. Parties Involved in Origination
Changes in the operation of the mortgage market have contributed to the proliferation of 
abusive mortgage lending practices.  One of the changes exacerbating the problem is the type of 
parties involved in the mortgage origination process.  Today loans are originated by mortgage 
companies and mortgage brokers whose sole purpose is the origination function.172  Mortgage 
companies may fund a mortgage loan initially with borrowed funds, but will sell the loan as soon 
as the company has enough loans for a pool.  Therefore, a mortgage company does not have to 
be highly capitalized.173  Mortgage brokers require even less capital since they typically do not 
170Id. §2:4; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 42.  Senior securities have 
less risk and a lower interest rate, while subordinate securities have greater risk and a higher 
interest rate.  See Schwarcz, supra note 164, at 143.
171See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 42.
172See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.  Subprime lenders rely more on 
brokers and “correspondents”–lenders who make loans using funds borrowed through a 
warehouse line of credit–than do prime lenders.  See WEICHER, supra note 43, at 32-33.  In 1996, 
47 percent of suprime loans were originated by correspondents and 36 percent by brokers.  Id. at 
32.  In the prime market in the same year, correspondents accounted for 35 percent of 
originations and brokers for 22 percent.  Id.
173See Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization’s Role in Housing Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 24 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996) (“Although it is a stretch 
to suggest that anyone with a modem and a fax machine can be a lender today, relatively little 
capital is required to start a mortgage banking operation in the 1990s, and even less to become a 
mortgage broker.”), quoted in Eggert, supra note 144, at 556.  Yesterday’s lenders had to be 
more highly capitalized because they generally retained ownership of the loans they originated 
for the life of the loans.
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fund loans, but just make a fee for putting borrower and lender together, for taking the 
borrower’s loan application, for checking the borrower’s credit, and for otherwise participating 
in the origination process.174  As a result, when a borrower has a claim against a mortgage 
company or broker for predatory lending practices, the culpable party may be judgment-proof.
Also contributing to the predatory lending problem is the lack of regulation of parties 
involved in the origination process.  The HUD-Treasury National Predatory Lending Task Force 
identified mortgage brokers and home improvement contractors, both intermediaries in the 
origination of mortgage loans, as being significantly involved in predatory lending practices.175
Both are significantly less regulated than the depository institutions that originated many 
mortgage loans in the past.  Home improvement contractors are subject to regulation under the 
law of some states, but not under federal law.176  Regulation of mortgage brokers is primarily
state law and is modest compared to regulation of the other types of institutions involved in 
home mortgage lending.177  The lack of regulation makes it easier to get into the mortgage 
brokering business, easier to perpetrate abusive practices, and easier to close up shop before 
victims of abuse can be compensated.
The low capitalization necessary for mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers as well as 
their lack of regulation has led to the proliferation of mortgage lending abuses by fly-by-night 
174Id; HUD/Treasury Joint Report, supra note 26, at 39.
175HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 39.
176Id.
177Id. at 40.    In response to the predatory lending problem, some states have recently 
adopted more stringent regulation and licensing requirements for mortgage bankers and 
mortgage brokers, including new bonding and educational requirements.  See GAO REPORT, 
supra note 23, at 62.
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operators.  Mortgage bankers and brokers can originate loans using predatory practices, then shut 
down and move to another state.  When originators quickly sell loans on the secondary market 
after origination, the new lender is left to deal with any defenses to payment or may be immune 
under the holder in due course doctrine.178  When intermediaries like home improvement 
contractors and mortgage brokers are involved in originating a loan, they may be more 
concerned with generating fees than with the loan’s ultimate repayment.179  But when the 
homeowner seeks a remedy, the intermediary may be judgment proof, may have moved to 
another state, or may be out of business.  The homeowner may thus be left without a remedy.
C. Separation of Investors from the Problems
The new horizontal segmentation of the mortgage lending market is also a factor in the 
increase in predatory lending.  Because of the separation in the functions of mortgage lending, 
the party who deals directly with the borrower in brokering or originating the loan may not have 
any dealings with the borrower after origination.  Although originating lenders sometimes retain 
the servicing function, where a broker is involved, the originating lender may not even have an 
office in the same community or the same state as the borrower.  The parties who broker, 
originate, and service loans rarely own the loans they broker, originate or service.
Thus, investors in mortgage loans can separate themselves from any abusive practices.  
They do not suffer harm to their reputations that might come about by being involved in abusive 
practices.  In addition, as discussed below, purchasers of abusive loans are often protected by the 
178See infra subpart D.
179HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 40.
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holder in due course doctrine against many of a borrower’s claims or defenses that might arise 
from the abusive practices.180  Purchasers of securities backed by predatory loans are further 
separated from involvement in the origination or terms of individual loans and are further 
insulated from loss.181  Therefore, investors may provide the funding for predatory loans while 
turning a blind eye to the abusive practices involved in their origination. 
D. Holder in Due Course Doctrine
One factor that insulates investors in predatory loans from liability is the holder in due 
course doctrine.  The holder182 of a negotiable promissory note183 becomes a holder in due course 
if the note is not obviously forged, altered, irregular or incomplete and the holder takes it for 
value, in good faith, and without notice of certain problems.184  A holder in due course holds a 
180See Eggert, supra note 144, at 613; Forrester, supra note 27, at 422.  See infra subpart 
D.
181See infra subpart E.
182A holder is a person who obtains an instrument by negotiation.  See U.C.C. § 3-201(a) 
(2000).  Negotiation requires transfer of possession and indorsement for an instrument payable to 
the order of a particular party.  Id. § 3-201(b).
183A negotiable instrument is “an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of 
money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes 
into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person 
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money 
. . . .”
U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2000).
184A holder in due course is “the holder of an instrument if:
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note free from personal defenses of the maker and claims in recoupment of the maker against the 
original payee.185  Personal defenses include fraud in the inducement, misrepresentation, 
mistake, lack or failure of consideration, and breach of warranty.186
The problems that give rise to personal defenses are exactly the types of problems that 
often exist in predatory mortgage loans.  Therefore, an assignee who is a holder in due course 
can avoid these defenses to payment and require the borrower to pay the note despite valid 
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear 
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or 
incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and
(2) the holder took the instrument:
(A) for value;
(B) in good faith;
(C)without notice that the instrument is overdue or has 
been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to 
payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series;
(D) without notice that the instrument contains an 
unauthorized signature or has been altered;
(E) without notice of any claim to the instrument described 
in Section 3-306; and
(F) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in 
recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).
U.C.C. § 3-302(a).
Good faith requires both “honesty in fact” and “ the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.” U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4).  In determining if a holder has 
observed reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, the test is not whether the holder 
exercised care in the purchase of a note but considers rather the fairness of the holder’s conduct.  
U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4.
185U.C.C. § 3-305.
186U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2.
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defenses to payment.187  The borrower’s only recourse then is to sue the originator or broker who 
committed the fraud or engaged in other conduct giving rise to a defense.  These parties may no 
longer be in business or may be judgment proof.188  Thus, the borrower may have to continue 
paying on the note to avoid foreclosure and yet lack any meaningful recourse against the 
culpable parties.
The holder in due course doctrine has a history of creating problems for consumers.  Prior 
to 1976, sellers of goods and services to consumers could separate the consumer’s obligation to 
pay from the seller’s obligation to perform by selling the consumer’s note to a holder in due 
course.189  The transferee of the note, as a holder in due course free of personal defenses, could 
insist on payment even if the goods or services were not delivered, were not performed, or were 
defective.  The FTC found that sellers used this ability to transfer a note free from contract 
defenses as a means to effectuate unethical sales practices in consumer transactions.190
In response to these abuses in consumer sales, the FTC promulgated a trade regulation 
rule, the Holder in Due Course Rule, which eliminates the holder in due course doctrine for 
187See, e.g., Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F.Supp.2d 530 (E.D. N.Y. 2003) (holding that current 
lenders who acquired mortgage loans at closing or on the secondary market were holders in due 
course and thus claims based on predatory lending practices of original lenders were dismissed 
against current lenders);  Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 2005 WL 613535 (Miss. 2005) (holding 
that the assignee of home mortgage loan, as a holder in due course, was immune from claims that 
the original lender had engaged in predatory lending practices).
188See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
189Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of consumers’ Claims 
and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022-23 (1976); Forrester, supra note 151, at 1105.
190Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses: Promulgation of Trade Regulation 
Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,509 (1975).
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certain transactions.191  The Rule operates by requiring a notice in consumer credit contracts that 
makes the holder of the contract subject to claims and defenses that the debtor could assert 
against the seller.192  Affirmative recovery by a consumer against the holder of a consumer credit 
contract is limited to the amount that the consumer has already paid,193 so the holder’s loss is 
limited to the amount to be paid under the consumer credit contract.  The FTC Holder in Due 
Course Rule applies only to sales of goods or services for personal, family or household use and 
for $25,000 or less.194  Therefore, it applies to some home improvement loans, but not to other 
home mortgage loans.
At the time the FTC rule was adopted, lenders predicted dire consequences which did not 
materialize.195  The FTC Holder in Due Course Rule caused only a small reduction in the 
availability of consumer credit.196  In 1988, the FTC reviewed the Rule to determine the 
economic impact on small businesses and, in particular, on the availability of credit, but it 
191Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (2005).
192See id. § 433.2.
193See id. § 433.2 (a), (b).
19416 C.F.R. § 4.33.1(b), (d), (e).
195Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over 
Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 429-30 (2002); William H. 
Lawrence & John H. Minan, The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine on 
the Commercialization of Innovative Consumer Products, 64 B.U. L. REV. 325, 338-39 & n.51 
(1984).
196See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 503 (4th
ed. 1995); Eggert, supra note 195, at 429; Lawrence & Minan, supra note 195, at 338-39 & n.51; 
Edward L. Rubin, Learning From Lord Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for Modern 
commercial Practice, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 775, 789 (1995).
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received few comments in response to its review.197  Honest merchants and lenders were able to 
adapt to the FTC Rule, so only the dishonest ones were greatly affected.198
HOEPA has a provision that operates in a manner similar to the FTC Holder in Due 
Course Rule for home mortgage loans covered by HOEPA.199  Like the FTC Rule, HOEPA 
limits the liability of the assignee of a loan to the amount to be paid under the loan.200  In 
addition, many state predatory lending statutes also provide for assignee liability to varying 
degrees.201
E. Further Insulation by Securitization
Independent of the holder in due course doctrine, investors in mortgaged-backed 
securities are protected against loss beyond the loss of their investment.  Investors hold securities 
representing an interest in a pool of loans and are not holders of any individual loans.  Therefore, 
the risk of loss to the investor is determined by the performance of the entire pool of loans rather 
than by any individual loan.  In a securitization, an SPV is typically the holder of the loans.202  In 
most securitization transactions, the SPV is created for the particular transaction and its only 
197See FTC Ends Review of “Holder” Rule, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F93/holderrul2.htm.    The FTC concluded that the Rule had 
“not had a significant economic impact on small businesses” and retained the rule as written.  Id.
198See Homer Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Credit-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 
COLUM. L. REV. 445, 473 (1968).
199See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
200See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
201See supra notes 134, 136, and 138-39 and accompanying text.
202See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
42
assets are the loans making up the pool that is the subject of the securitization.203  If a borrower 
has a defense to payment of a particular loan that the borrower may assert against the SPV,204
then the loss is spread among the holders of the securities.  Even if an SPV as holder of a 
predatory loan has affirmative liability to a borrower, its only assets from which to pay that 
liability are the other loans in the pool and, once again, the risk is spread among the holders of 
the securities.  If the SPV becomes insolvent, then the investors lose their investment, but cannot 
have further liability to injured borrowers.  The borrowers, not the investors, are the ones who 
can end up holding the bag.
The risk to investors in mortgage backed securities is further reduced where there are 
credit enhancements such as third-party insurance, guarantees, surety bonds, or letters of credit 
whereby “a creditworthy party ensures payment of all or a portion of the securities issued by the 
SPV.”205  In this case, the third party bears all or some of the risk of loss.  Another type of “credit 
enhancement” involves the purchase by a third party of subordinated securities.206  The owner of 
the subordinated securities bears more of the risk of loss than the holders of the senior securities 
who are thus protected against loss.  Therefore, investors in mortgaged backed securities are 
protected against loss caused by predatory lending practices of the originator even beyond 
protection provided by the holder in due course doctrine and even where the doctrine does not 
apply.
203See Schwarcz, supra note 164, at 138.
204The borrower may be able to assert a defense because it is a real rather than a personal 
defense or because the SPV is subject to defenses under HOEPA or a state predatory lending 
statute.
205SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 2:3 at 15-16.
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F. Increased Availability of Subprime Credit Due to Securitization
Securitization of mortgage loans also contributes to the predatory lending problem 
because of the greatly increased amount of capital now available for investment in mortgage 
loans.  When most home mortgage loans were made by depository institutions, the limited 
available credit went to prime borrowers.207  The tremendous increase in the size of the market 
for subprime loans is a result of securitization.  Since the 1990s when securitization of subprime 
loans proliferated, the volume of subprime lending has increased drastically from $35 billion in 
1994 to $160 billion in 1999208 and to $529 billion in 2004.209  In addition, as securitization of 
subprime loans has become more common, prime lenders, Wall Street investment firms, and the 
GSEs have become involved as additional players in the subprime market.210
206Id. §2:4.
207Engel & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1272-73; Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, 
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 406-07 
(1981); John V. Duca & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Do Mortgage Rates Vary Based on Household 
Default Characteristics? Evidence on Rate Sorting and Credit Rationing, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & 
ECON. 99, 101-02 (1994).  Finance companies making subprime loans mostly made second lien 
loans for home improvement or debt consolidation.  See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying 
text.
208HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 2, 42.  See also Hearings on 
Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 398 (statement of Mike Shea, Executive 
Director, ACORN Housing Corp.) (increasing 900% between 1993 and 1999), 345 (statement of 
David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition) (“increased almost 1000 
percent from 1993-1998").
209Top 25 B&C Lenders in 2004, 2005 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Vol. 1 
(March 2005).
210HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45-46.  GSE involvement has been 
primarily with subprime borrowers with A- credit ratings.  Id. at 46.
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With the increase in the size of the subprime market has come an increase in predatory 
lending abuses.211  Notably, the increase in subprime lending and the related increase in 
predatory lending occurred after the enactment of HOEPA.  The availability of legitimate 
subprime loans to borrowers who do not qualify for prime loans should theoretically reduce the 
amount of predatory lending because borrowers should have more options.  However, most 
victims of predatory lenders do not shop around for the best deal.  In fact, many homeowners 
with predatory loans did not seek out credit but were approached by the lender, a home 
improvement contractor, or a mortgage broker.  These homeowners may not understand the 
terms of their loans, may not realize they could get credit on better terms, or may have been 
fraudulently induced into the loan with promises of better terms than they ultimately receive.212
As a result, predatory lending continues despite the availability of reputable subprime lending 
options.  The increased availability of funds created by securitization of subprime loans has 
made more funds available to predatory lenders as well.
G. Market Failure
Professors Engel and McCoy make a compelling argument that market failures have been 
a key factor in the proliferation of predatory loans.213  They classify the mortgage market into 
211See 66 F.R. 65604 (“With this increase in subprime lending there has also been an 
increase in reports of “predatory lending.”).   A consumer advocacy group estimated in 2001 that 
predatory lending cost affected borrowers to the extent of $9.1 billion annually.  See Eric Stein, 
Coalition for Responsible Lending, Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending 3, 
available at http://responsiblelending.org.
212See Forrester, supra note 27, at 389-90.
213Engel & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1277-97.  See also Forrester, supra note 27, at 
419-21 (discussing market failure in home equity loan market).
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three segments: the prime market, the legitimate subprime market, and the predatory loan 
market.214  Borrowers in the predatory loan market are disconnected from the credit market 
“because of historical credit rationing, discrimination, and other social and economic forces.”215
Some of the borrowers in the predatory market could qualify for prime loans but for some reason 
do not have access to the prime market.216  Others are properly classified as subprime borrowers, 
but do not have access to the legitimate subprime market.  Finally, some simply cannot afford 
credit and should not have access to any type of loan.217
People who are disconnected from the credit market are those who for some reason 
cannot or do not shop for the best credit deal.218  They tend to be borrowers who do not shop for 
credit at all because they may not realize that credit is available.  They are targeted by 
contractors, brokers, and predatory lenders who take advantage of information asymmetries to 
induce the borrowers to take out a loan on disadvantageous terms because they are not aware that 
better terms are available.219  Predatory lenders have very different marketing strategies from 
legitimate lenders who advertise then wait for borrowers to approach them.  Predatory lenders 
shop for and approach the borrowers and thus reach borrowers who would not otherwise apply 
214Engel & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1278.
215Id. at 1279.
216Id.; Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and 
Fairer for America’s Families Ch. 5 n.5-6 (Sept. 1996) available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/.  One Freddie Mac study determined that between 
ten and fifty percent of subprime borrowers qualified for a prime loan, id. Ch. 5 n.5, and a poll of 
subprime lenders found that half of subprime borrowers qualified for a prime loan,  id. Ch. 5 n.6.
217See Engel & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1279.
218Id. at 1281.
219See Forrester, supra note 27, at 389, 420.
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for a loan on their own.220  Therefore, the existence of legitimate subprime lenders does not drive 
predatory lenders out of the market.  Since the market cannot eliminate predatory lending, 
government intervention is necessary.
H. Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Legislation
Another factor in the growth of predatory lending has been the federal preemption of 
state consumer protection measures.221  In 1980 Congress enacted the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA),222 which preempts state usury ceilings on 
any “federally related mortgage loan” secured by a first lien on residential real estate.223  Because 
of DIDMCA’s broad definition of “federally related mortgage loan,” the preemption applies to 
220See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
221See Forrester, supra note 27, at 388, 419; Mansfield, supra note 144, at 476.
222Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. at 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.).
22312 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000).  The reasons for Congress’ preemption of state 
usury laws were:
(i) to promote the stability and viability of financial institutions by allowing them 
to charge and collect realistic market interest on mortgage loans, and (ii) to 
promote the national housing policy and the American dream of homeownership 
by legislatively opening a spigot which would insure an increased and evenly-
spread flow of available mortgage money.
Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 911 (3rd Cir. 1990) (quoting Bank of 
New York v. Hoyt, 617 F.Supp. 1304, 1311 (D.R.I. 1985).  Preemption of usury laws was 
necessary to the viability and stability of the nation’s financial institutions because DIDMCA 
also eliminated ceilings on interest rates paid on savings and loan deposits.  S. REP. NO. 368, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 255.  Preemption of usury laws 
promoted homeownership because interest rates had risen above usury ceilings in some states 
making mortgage funds unavailable in those states since lenders could not make loans at market 
rates.  Id. at 254-55.
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virtually any first lien home mortgage made by an institutional lender.224  DIDMCA provides 
that states could opt out of the usury preemption during a specified time period, but only sixteen 
jurisdictions did so.225  Although DIDMCA is limited in its application to first lien loans, lenders 
can require a borrower to refinance existing liens in order to fit within the preemption.226  Most 
courts that have addressed the issue have held that the DIDMCA preemption applies to non-
purchase money loans so long as the lender has a first lien.227  The issue now appears to be 
settled.228
224See Forrester, supra note 27, at 399.  A federally related mortgage loan is any loan that 
is (1) made by a lender whose deposits or accounts are federally insured, (2) made by a federally 
regulated lender, (3) made, insured, guaranteed, or otherwise assisted by HUD or any other 
federal agency, (4) eligible for purchase by FNMA, GNMA, or FHLMC, or from any financial 
institution from which it could be purchased by FHLMC, or (5) made by any creditor subject to 
the Truth in Lending Act who makes or invests in residential real estate loans totaling more than 
$1 million per year.  12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5(b)(2).  For purposes of the usury law preemption, the 
term is expanded to include loans made by any lender approved by HUD for participation in a 
federal mortgage insurance program and loans made by an individual providing financing for the 
sale of the individual’s residence.  See id.  § 1735f-7a(a)(1)(C)(vi).  
225See Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and 
Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 315 (1993).
226See Forrester, supra note 27, at 417-18.
227See Brown v. Investor Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith v. 
Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 912 (3rd Cir. 1990); Gora v. Banc One Fin. 
Servs., Inc., No. 95 C 2542, 1995 WL 613131 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1995); L.G.H. Enters., Inc. v. 
Kadilac Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. (In re L.G.H. Enters.), 146 B.R. 612, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).  See 
also Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D.R.I. 1985) (finding that DIDMCA 
applies to construction loans made to residential developers so long as other statutory 
requirements are met); FirstSouth F.A. v. Lawson Square, Inc. (In re Lawson Square, Inc.), 61 
B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986) (finding that DIDMCA applies to loans made for the 
purpose of developing residential real estate so long as the lender takes a first lien on the 
property).  But see Fidelity Fin. Servs. Inc. V. Hicks, 214 Ill.App.3d 398, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(holding that DIDMCA applies only to purchase money loans).
228See Mansfield, supra note 144, at 520.
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Because of DIDMCA, subprime lenders can legally charge whatever rate of interest a 
particular borrower will pay by requiring a first lien on the borrower’s home.  Because of the 
market failures discussed above,229 some borrowers will pay interest at a rate higher than the rate 
that would reflect the lender’s risk of making the loan.230   One of the characteristics of a 
predatory loan is an interest rate that exceeds the amount necessary to compensate the lender for 
the risk of making the loan.231   Some borrowers that could obtain prime loans are steered to the 
subprime market.  Other borrowers are subprime borrowers but pay more interest in the 
predatory loan market than they would pay in the legitimate prime market.232  DIDMCA is one 
of the causes of the predatory lending problem because states could regulate the rates that lenders 
charge on first lien home mortgage loans absent DIDMCA.
Another federal statute, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (Parity Act) 
preempts state laws that restrict alternative mortgage transactions,233 which include variable 
interest rate loans, loans with balloon payments, and shared appreciation mortgages.234  The 
Parity Act applies to any “loan or credit sale secured by an interest in residential real 
229See supra subpart G.
230See Engels & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1279 (discussing subprime borrowers who 
would qualify for a prime loan); see also Mansfield, supra note 144, at 542 (“[I]t does not appear 
that pricing is closely tied to actual risk or any other objective factors.”).  As evidence, Professor 
Mansfield cites, inter alia, the profitability of subprime lenders and their lack of uniformity in 
underwriting and pricing.  Id. at 540-41.
231See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
232See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
23312 U.S.C. § 3803 (2000).
234Id. § 3802(1).
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property,”235 so it is not limited to purchase money loans or to loans secured by a first lien.236
Various federal agencies had adopted regulations that permitted federally chartered financial 
institutions to provide alternative mortgage financing,237 and the Parity Act extended the 
preemption of state law in this area to apply to other residential mortgage lenders.238  Under the 
Parity Act, these other lenders may make alternative mortgage loans that comply with the federal 
regulations rather than with state law.239  As with the federal preemption of state usury law under 
DIDMCA, states were permitted to opt out of the preemption,240 and several states did.241
Under the Parity Act, predatory lenders have been able to require certain onerous terms in 
home mortgage loans because state regulation of those terms has been preempted by the Act.  
For example, states may not prohibit balloon payments in home mortgage loans because of 
Parity Act.242  Therefore, a predatory loan may be amortized over 30 years, but with a large 
balloon payment due after only three years.  When a balloon payment becomes due, the borrower 
235Id.  Congress enacted the statute because "alternative mortgage transactions are 
essential to the provision of an adequate supply of credit secured by residential property.”  Id. § 
3801(a)(2).
236See Forrester, supra note 27, at 419.
23712 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(3).
238Id. § 3803(c).
239Id. § 3801(b), 3803(a).  Congress gave authority to the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (for banks), the National Credit Union Administration (for credit unions), and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (for other housing creditors) to “identify, describe, and publish those 
portions or provisions of their respective regulations that are inappropriate for (and thus 
inapplicable to), or that need to be conformed for the use of, nonfederally chartered housing 
creditors. . . .”  Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 807(b), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 3801 note.
24012 U.S.C. § 3804.
241See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1-110 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. BANKING 
LAW § 6-g (McKinney 1990).
242See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3802(1)(B), 3803.
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must find the funds to pay off the loan or refinance, which means additional fees and closing 
costs.  Until recently, predatory lenders could also charge large prepayment penalties and 
onerous late charges without regard to state regulation because of the Parity Act.243  Balloon 
payments, large prepayment penalties, and onerous late charges are all common features of a 
predatory loan.244
In 2003 the OTS removed both prepayment rules and late fee rules from the list of its 
regulations that preempt state law under the Parity Act.245  The OTS had determined that “the 
application of its late fee and prepayment penalty regulations to housing creditors might be 
contributing to predatory lending practices in the subprime mortgage market.”246  The change 
was backed by state attorneys general as a means to combat predatory lending.247  In response to 
a challenge by the National Home Equity Mortgage Association, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia upheld the right of the OTS to determine the types of loan terms that are 
covered by the Parity Act.248  Therefore, states may now regulate prepayment premiums and late 
fees for nonfederally chartered lenders.  For federal banks and thrifts, however, state consumer 
protection measures aimed at combating the predatory lending problem are preempted.
24312 C.F.R. §§ 560.33, 560.34 (amended).  Prepayment penalties are much more 
common in subprime loans than in prime loans.
244See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
DIDMCA and the Parity Act allow high interest rates and unfair loan terms that might 
otherwise be prohibited by state law.  Bankruptcy law prevents the loan terms from being 
changed.  See Forrester, supra note 27, at 427-35.
24567 Fed. Reg. 60,542  (2002).
246National Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n v. OTS, 373 F.3d 1355, 1357 (2004) (citing 65 
Fed. Reg. 17,811, 17,813 (Apr. 5, 2000)).
247373 F.3d at 1361-62.
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IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE PREDATORY LENDING LAWS
A. Recent Regulatory Developments
In 1996 pursuant to Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA),249 the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) issued regulations that preempt state laws “affecting the operations of federal 
savings associations . . . to enable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in 
accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions.”250  The regulation specifically provides 
that it “occupies the entire field for regulation of federal savings associations.”251  More 
specifically, the regulation preempts state laws that impose requirements regarding licensing, 
credit terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements, origination, and interest rate ceilings.252
Recently, the OTS has issued letters announcing preemption of predatory lending statutes in 
Georgia,253 New York,254  New Jersey,255 and New Mexico.256  In addition, the OTS has 
248Id. at 1356.
24912 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68c (2000).
25012 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005).
251Id.
25212 C.F.R. § 560.2(b).  The regulation provides that it does not preempt state laws that 
“only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations” such as contract 
and commercial law, real property law, tort law and criminal law.  Id. § 560.2(c).
253Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-1 (Jan. 21, 
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
254Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-2 (Jan. 30, 
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
255Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-5 (July 22, 
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
256Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-6 (Sept. 2, 
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
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concluded that operating subsidiaries of federal savings associations enjoy the same preemption 
as the associations themselves.257
In January of 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a 
regulation preempting state laws governing mortgage lending as applied to national banks and 
their operating  subsidiaries.258  The regulation preempts “state laws that obstruct, impair, or 
condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending 
powers.”259  Specifically, the regulation preempts state law limitations on licensing and 
registration, insurance requirements, loan-to-value ratios, amortization, payments, term, escrow 
accounts, disclosures, due on sale clauses, and other matters.260  Therefore, the regulation would 
preempt state predatory lending statutes.261
In another rule finalized on the same day, the OCC amended its regulation on visitorial 
powers.262  The amended regulation provides that “the OCC has exclusive visitorial authority 
with respect to the content and the conduct of activities authorized for national banks under 
257Id. at 2 n.4.
258Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904, 1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2005)).  On the same day the OCC 
issued regulations preempting state laws in the areas of deposit-taking, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007, non-
mortgage lending, id. § 7.4008, and the business of banking generally id. § 7.4009.
25912 C.F.R. § 34.4 (a) (2005).
260Id.
261In August of 2003 the OCC made a preemption determination about the Georgia act 
only, Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003), and at that time 
issued the proposed regulation preempting all state predatory lending laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119 
(Aug. 5, 2003).
262Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2005)).
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Federal law.”263  The OCC claims pursuant to its regulations that state authorities do not have 
any visitorial powers over national banks or over their operating subsidiaries.264  The rule 
provides that the OCC has exclusive authority to initiate either administrative or judicial
proceedings to enforce state law against national banks as well as against their operating 
subsidiaries.265  This amendment goes hand-in-hand with the preemption regulation by making 
clear the OCC’s position that states do not have visitorial powers to enforce state laws.
The OCC preemption regulation is similar in its scope to the OTS regulation preempting 
state lending requirements as related to federal savings associations.  Although the OCC has not 
formally adopted a rule of field preemption as did the OTS, the OCC has described its 
regulations as having the same preemptive effect as the OTS regulations.266  Thus, virtually all 
provisions of every state predatory lending statute would be preempted according to the 
regulation.
In an attempt to militate against the effects of preempting state laws aimed at curbing 
mortgage lending abuses, the regulation adds certain limits.  The regulation prohibits national 
banks from making loans “based predominantly on the bank’s realization of the foreclosure or 
liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay 
the loan.”267  In addition, the regulation prohibits practices that would be unfair or deceptive 
26312 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(3).
264See  69 Fed. Reg. 1900-01, 1913.
265See  69 Fed. Reg. 1897-1900.
266See 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119, 46,129 n.91 (Aug. 5, 2003); OCC, News Release 2004-3, 
OCC Issues Final Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers at 1, 4 (Jan. 7, 
2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov; Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 234-35.
26712 C.F.R. § 34.3(b).
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under the Federal Trade Commission Act.268  Since, however, banks were already subject to FTC 
trade regulations, the OCC regulation adds very little.
The OCC regulation explicitly applies to the operating subsidiaries of national banks as 
well as to national banks themselves.   A national bank may apply to the OCC to acquire or 
establish an operating subsidiary,269 and may conduct in an operating subsidiary the same 
activities that are permissible for a national bank.270  The permitted activities of an operating 
subsidiary include “[m]aking loans” and “[p]urchasing, selling servicing, or warehousing loans 
or other extensions of credit, or interests therein.”271  Therefore, the activities of a subprime 
mortgage lender could be conducted in an operating subsidiary of a national bank.
In promulgating the new regulations, the OCC stated that operating subsidiaries of 
national banks had not been involved in predatory lending.272  However, banks can now transfer 
mortgage operations to operating subsidiaries in order to avoid the operation of state predatory 
lending statutes and to engage in predatory lending practices.  Further, one concern expressed 
about the new regulation is the lack of oversight that the OCC will be able to provide.273  So even 
with the OCC’s prohibitions against predatory lending practices, the question arises as to the 
OCC’s ability to police operating subsidiaries of national banks as well as the banks themselves.
268Id. § 34.3(c).
26912 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(5)(i)(A) (2005).
270Id. § 5.34(e)(1).
271Id. § 5.34(e)(5)(v)(C), (D).
272See 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1914.
273See infra notes 447-52 and accompanying text.
55
B. Recent Developments in Congress
In March of 2005, Representatives Bob Ney and Paul Kanjorski274 introduced a bill in 
Congress that would amend HOEPA to preempt state predatory lending laws and would 
otherwise weaken some of HOEPA’s provisions.275  In addition to providing for the preemption 
of state predatory lending statutes, the bill would remove fees currently included in calculating 
the trigger for a high cost loan including fees for single premium credit insurance, would not 
prevent lenders from “flipping” subprime loans, and would weaken HOEPA provisions for 
assignee liability.276  Lending groups support the bill, particularly the preemption of state 
predatory lending laws.277  Consumer advocates do not.278
C. The Law of Preemption
274Ney is a Republican representing the 18th Congressional District of Ohio, and 
Kanjorski is a Democrat representing the 11th Congressional District of Pennsylvania.  See
Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Member Information, 
http://clerk.house.gov/members/index.html.
275Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005).  Earlier in the same month, 
Representatives Brad Miller (D-NC), Mel Watt (D-NC), and Barney Frank (D-MA) introduced a 
bill that would strengthen HOEPA along the same lines as North Carolina’s statute.  See Prohibit 
Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1182, 105th Cong. (2005).
276H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005).  See also Center for Responsible Lending, H.R. 1295 –
Responsible Lending Act; Center for Responsible Lending Section-by-Section Analysis, 22-23 
(April 6, 2005), at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pa-NK_Sections.pdf.
277See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, 
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, 
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage 
Brokers).
278See id. at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community 
Reinvestment), 4 (statement of Martin Eakes, CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible 
Lending).
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Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,279 Congress has the 
power to preempt state law280 so long as it is acting within the scope of its Constitutionally 
delegated powers.281  Determining whether Congress has preempted state law is a matter of 
determining Congressional intent.282  Courts may find express or implied Congressional intent to 
preempt state law.283  The Supreme Court, however, has created a presumption that areas of the 
law traditionally left to the states are not preempted by federal law “unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”284
Express preemption occurs when Congress includes a preemption clause in a federal 
statute stating explicitly its intent to preempt state law.285  An example is DIDMCA which 
expressly preempts state usury statutes unless a state has opted out.286  Another example is the 
279U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The Supremacy Clause provides that “the Laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution of 
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  Id.
280See id.; Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996); California Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
281See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
282Barnett, 517 U.S. at 30; Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
283See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) 
(“Congress’ intent may be ‘explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its 
structure and purpose.’”) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
284Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (quoted in Medtronic . . .); 
see also Nina M. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2004); 
Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory 
Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 824 (1995).
285Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 
U.S. at 525.
28612 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000).
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Ney-Kanjorski bill currently before Congress that would expressly preempt state predatory 
lending statutes.287
If a statute does not contain explicit preemption language, courts must determine 
“whether the federal statute’s ‘structure and purpose,’ or nonspecific statutory language, 
nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent.”288  The courts have found two 
different types of implied preemption, called conflict preemption and field preemption. 289
Conflict preemption occurs when there is an actual conflict between state and federal 
law.290  A conflict exists when compliance with both state and federal law would be a “physical 
impossibility”291 or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”292  The Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. 
Nelson found a conflict where federal law gave national banks in small towns the authority to 
sell insurance and a Florida statute prohibited national banks from selling insurance.293  The 
Court did not find a direct conflict since the federal statute did not require banks to sell 
insurance, but did find that the Florida statute was an obstacle to the accomplishment of one of 
287Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005).
288Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31 (citing Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 and Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982)).
289See McGreal, supra note 284, at 832; Caleb Nelson, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).
290Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. V. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. 
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
291Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), cited in 
Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31.
292Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), quoted in Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31.
293Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31, 37.
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the objectives of the federal statute.294  HOEPA preempts state law to the extent that state law is 
more tolerant than the federal requirements for loans covered by HOEPA.295  For example, if 
state law permits a lender to charge a higher interest rate on default in a home mortgage loan 
regardless of the loan’s interest rate, HOEPA’s prohibition against a higher interest rate on 
default in a HOEPA high-cost loan296 would preempt state law.
Field preemption occurs when a federal statute completely occupies a particular field 
which implies that Congress has withdrawn the power of states to legislate in that field.297
Courts find field preemption when the scheme of federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or the field is 
one “in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”298
Federal regulations can preempt state law to the same extent as federal statutes.299 The 
Supreme Court has held that “‘a federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally 
delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation’ and hence render unenforceable state or local 
294Id. at 31.
295See Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762,
766 (2002) (“[HOEPA] does not itself preempt any state law–except that state laws about the 
mortgage transactions defined in § 1602(aa) may not be more tolerant than the federal floor 
adopted in § 1639.”)
29615 U.S.C. § 1639(c).
297See Nelson, supra note 289, at 227.
298Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230, quoted in Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
299City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988); Fidelity Fed., 458 U.S. at 153.  See 
also United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (holding that VA regulations permitting the 
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laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law.”300  Congress can expressly delegate to 
an agency the power to preempt state law.  For example, the Parity Act gives authority to the 
OCC and the OTS to designate which of its regulations preempt state law.301
The power of an agency to preempt state law does not require express congressional 
authorization.302  If Congress has not expressed its intent that the agency preempt state law, the 
question becomes whether the agency intended to preempt state law, and if so, whether the 
agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority.303  If regulatory preemption of state 
law “represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the 
agency’s care by the statute, [the court] should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or 
its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have 
sanctioned.”304
When a regulation expressly states its intent to preempt state law,305 the question arises as 
to the deference to be given the agency’s interpretation.  This inquiry is complicated by the 
VA to pursue a deficiency judgment after foreclosure and payment on its guaranty preempted 
Pennsylvania’s anti-deficiency statute).
300City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. at 63-64 (quoting Louisiana Public Service 
Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986)).
301See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
302Fidelity Fed., 458 U.S. at 154.
303Id.
304United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961), quoted in City of New York v. 
FCC, 486 U.S. at 64.
305Both the OCC and the OTS regulations do just this.  See Bank Activities and 
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2005)) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005) (OTS).
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sometimes conflicting mandates of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.306 and Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.307  In Rice, the Supreme Court adopted a presumption against 
preemption of state law.308  In Chevron, which was not a preemption case, the Court held that 
courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes.309  Therefore, when an agency preempts 
state law, the question is whether the presumption against preemption trumps deference to the 
agency interpretation or vice versa.  The law is not clear as to how the mandates of these two 
cases should be reconciled.310  Some commentators have suggested that Chevron deference 
should yield to the Rice presumption in preemption cases.311  The issue arises in the context of 
the OCC and OTS regulations.
D. Authority of the OTS and OCC to Preempt State Predatory Lending Laws
The question arises as to the authority of the OCC and the OTS to preempt state lending 
laws including laws regulating predatory lending practices.  While OTS authority to issue broad 
regulations preempting state law is settled,312 the law regarding OCC authority under its new 
regulations remains untested.
306331 U.S. 218 (1947).
307467 U.S. 837 (1984).
308331 U.S. at 230.
309467 U.S. at 866.
310See Mendelson, supra note 284, at 739; McGreal, supra note 284, at 887.
311Mendelson, supra note 284, at 799-800.
312See infra notes 316-19 and accompanying text.
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Both OCC and OTS regulations include express statements of preemption.313  Therefore, 
it is clear that both agencies intend to preempt state predatory lending statutes.  The question 
then becomes whether the agencies are acting within the scope of their delegated authority.  
However, the analysis of OTS regulations issued under HOLA and OCC regulations issued 
under the National Banking Act (NBA)314 is not the same.315
The Supreme Court has held that section 5(a) of HOLA gave the predecessor agency to 
the OTS “plenary authority to issue regulations governing federal savings and loans.”316  The 
National Banking Act, however, does not give the OCC comparable authority.317  One court 
stated the difference as follows:  “As to national banks, Congress expressly left open a field for 
state regulation and the application of state laws; but as to federal savings and loan associations, 
Congress made plenary, preemptive delegation . . . leaving no room for state supervision.”318
313See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005) (providing that the regulation “occupies the entire 
field for regulation of federal savings associations”); 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (providing that”states 
laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally 
authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks.”).
31412 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. (2000).
315See Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 321-24.
316Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982) (quoted in 
Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 322).
317See Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 322.  But see Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins, 
National Bank Act Preemption: The OCC’s New Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to Consumer 
Protection or the Dual Banking System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 365, 391-96 (2004) 
(arguing that the OCC does have authority to preempt state law).
318People v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 98 F.Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).  
Although only a district court case, other courts including the Supreme Court have cited Coast
Federal for its holding as to the expansive authority of the OTS and its predecessor.  See
Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 323 (citing Fed. Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 
(1982); Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), 
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Other federal courts have distinguished the “broad preemptive authority of the OTS and the 
much more circumscribed power of the OCC.”319
Commentators differ on whether the new OCC regulation is within the scope of 
Congressionally delegated power.320  The focus of this article, however, is not on whether the 
OCC is authorized to preempt state predatory lending statutes, but rather on the normative issue 
as to whether the OCC should preempt state predatory lending laws.  Part of the answer lies in 
the involvement of banks in predatory lending abuses.  The OCC claims that banks have not 
been involved in predatory lending except to a very minor extent, but evidence to the contrary 
exists.
V. INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERALLY-SUPPORTED LENDERS IN THE SUBPRIME AND PREDATORY 
LENDING MARKETS
A. Banks and Thrifts
aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1069 (2003)).
319Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 323 (citing North Arlington National Bank v. Kearny 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 187 F.2d 564, 567 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951); 
Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1069 
(2003); Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 989 (3rd Cir. 1980)).
320See Cayne & Perkins, supra note 317, at 391-96 (arguing that the OCC does have 
authority to preempt state law); Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 287-316 (arguing that the regulations 
are not within OCC’s authority); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory 
Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (arguing that “the OCC 
overstepped its congressionally delegated authority when it promulgated the regulation”).
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Banks and thrifts are in fact involved in predatory lending in a number of ways.  Some 
banks and thrifts or their subsidiaries and affiliates do originate predatory loans.321  Furthermore, 
banks and thrifts can profit from predatory lending by purchasing predatory loans or securities 
backed by predatory loans, by lending to predatory lenders and thus financing their predatory 
lending practices, by providing securitization services to predatory lenders, and by steering 
customers who could qualify for prime loans to subprime loans.322
Some banks and thrifts are subprime lenders,323 and some have practiced predatory 
lending abuses.324  Banks and thrifts are increasingly involved in the subprime mortgage market 
through subsidiaries and affiliates,325 and some of the subsidiaries and affiliates engage in 
321See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 3-6; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, 
The CRA Implications of Predatory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1575-76 (2002).
322See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 3-6; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 
1577-78.  See also HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45 (discussing bank and 
thrift involvement in the subprime market).
323At the time of HUD/Treasury Joint Report, one percent of FDIC insured institutions 
were subprime lenders, defined as lenders with more than 25 percent of their equity capital in 
subprime loans.  HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 44.
324See, e.g., McCarthy v. FDIC, 348 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the OTS 
closed Superior Bank because of its predatory lending practices); State of Arizona v. Hispanic 
Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., CV 2000-003625 (2003); In the Matter of Clear Lake National 
Bank, San Antonio, Texas, OCC Enforcement Action 2003-135 (Nov. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2003-135.pdf (finding violations of HOEPA, RESPA, 
TILA and the FTC Act).  See also OCC, News Release, OCC Issued Final Rules on National 
Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers, NR 2004-3 (Jan. 7, 2004) (quoting John Hawke as 
saying, “We have seen only isolated cases of abusive practices among national banks.”); NCLC 
Comments, supra note 24, at 3-6 (listing cases against national banks for alleged predatory 
practices).
325See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45.  Banks, savings associations, 
and their affiliates originated approximately one quarter of all subprime loans in 1998, id., and 
eight of the ten largest subprime lenders in 2000 were affiliated with banks, Engel & McCoy, 
supra note 321, at 1585 (citing Robert Julavits, Subprime Risks Extending Beyond Borrowers,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 9).
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predatory lending practices.326  Bank affiliates, including Citigroup and Household, have paid 
huge sums in settlement of allegations of predatory lending practices.327  Borrowers have sued 
national banks, their operating subsidiaries, or their affiliates for practices including fraud and 
misrepresentation, loan flipping, and violations of HOEPA, the Truth in Lending Act, the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and state consumer protection laws.328
When banks make subprime loans or have affiliates that make subprime loans, they can 
steer customers who would qualify for a prime loan to a subprime loan or to their subprime 
affiliate.329  Citifinancial is currently under investigation by the New York attorney general for 
steering customers to subprime loans.330  Banks profit when borrowers pay more for credit than 
they should have to pay based on their credit histories.
Banks and thrifts also purchase predatory loans to hold or securitize or purchase 
securities backed by predatory loans.331  When banks purchase predatory loans, they can 
generally take advantage of the holder in due course doctrine unless the loans are high cost 
mortgages as defined by HOEPA.  When banks securitize loans, they generally employ various 
contractual forms of recourse that require the originator or seller to repurchase the loans in the 
326See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
327See supra notes 12, 17, and 23 and accompanying text.
328See NCLC Comments, supra note24, at 4-6.
329See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1578-80.
330See Citigroup Violated Policy, supra note 20, at C1.
331See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 3; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1576.
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event they do not conform to certain standards.332  Thus, banks and thrifts can profit from 
purchasing predatory loans or securities backed by predatory loans without concern for liability.
Banks have recently played an important role in securitizing subprime loans “because of 
their access to credit markets and their expertise in securitizing mortgages.”333  Banks may 
“serve as underwriters, trustees, registrars and paying agents for securitizations of subprime 
loans, some of which may be predatory.”334  National banks have served as trustees for notorious 
predatory lenders including Associates, Household Finance, Delta Funding, and First Alliance.335
Finally, banks may finance predatory lenders through warehouse lines of credit secured 
by the predatory loans.336  With a warehouse line of credit, a mortgage company uses borrowed 
funds to originate mortgage loans that will eventually be packaged and sold on the secondary 
market or securitized.337  Therefore, banks can facilitate the practices of predatory lenders by 
lending them the funds they use to make predatory loans.  When banks hold predatory loans as 
security for a line of credit, they again can take advantage of the holder in due course doctrine 
unless the loans are high cost mortgages as defined by HOEPA.
332See Eggert, supra note 144, at 548.
333HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45.
334Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1577.
335See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 6-7.
336See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45; Engel & McCoy, supra note 
321, at 1577.
337See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 487.  After each mortgage loan is made, 
the note and deed of trust are temporarily pledged to the bank as collateral for the line of credit.  
It is called a warehouse line of credit because “the mortgage loans are ‘parked’ in the bank’s 
‘warehouse’ for a short period (perhaps 30 to 90 days) until the mortgage company is ready to 
sell them to secondary market investors or securitize them.” Id.
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Banks and thrifts receive a number of federal benefits not available to others involved in 
the business of home mortgage lending.  Banks and thrifts receive a gross federal subsidy from 
the federal safety net, which includes federal deposit insurance as well as access to the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window and payment system.338  First, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits of member institutions up to $100,000,339 and deposit 
insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government.340  As a result, banks 
and thrifts can attract deposits for lower interest rates than uninsured institutions because the 
deposits are insured by the federal government.  Even uninsured deposits have protection 
through the federal government’s bank resolution practices.341  In addition, banks and thrifts 
have access to the federal reserve system.  The Federal Reserve’s discount window provides a 
backup source of credit to banks,342 and the Federal Reserve’s payment system includes 
338See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586; Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in 
Banking: The Link to Financial Modernization, Fed. Res. Bank of S.F. Econ. Ltr. No. 97-31 
(Oct. 24, 1997), available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el97-31.html; Kenneth 
Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for 
Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 1 (1999); Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. 
Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895, 
1895, 1917 (1997); Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for 
Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING L.J.446, 466 (1998); John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net 
Subsidy Be Contained?, 84 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECONOMIC Q., Winter 1998, at 1, 2.
339See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 8.03 [1][b][ii] (2nd ed. 2001 & cum. 
supps.).  Bank deposits are insured by the Bank Insurance Fund and thrift deposits by the 
Savings Association Insurance Fund, both of which are administered by the FDIC and are funded 
with premiums paid by banks and thrifts, respectively.  Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 3 
n.3.
340Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 3.  Resort to the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
Treasury was necessary to resolve the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.  See id.
341See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586.
342See  Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 3.
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overdraft protection for interbank transfers on Fedwire.343  In addition to the federal safety net, 
banks’ and thrifts’ charters give them a quasi-oligopoly because entry by new competitors is 
controlled by government regulators.344
In exchange for the benefits they receive, banks and thrifts are highly regulated.  National 
banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.345  A primary aim of bank 
regulation is “to ensure the safe and sound practices and operations of individual banking 
institutions” and therefore to protect taxpayers and depositors.346  “Banks have high regulatory 
compliance costs, including examination and reporting requirements, reserve requirements, and 
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums (although risk-adjusted premiums have been 
essentially toothless in recent years because most banks pay zero premiums).”347  Thrift 
institutions also are heavily regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).348
Whether federal banks and thrifts receive a net federal subsidy, in other words,  whether 
federal benefits that banks and thrifts receive outweigh regulatory costs, is the subject of 
343See id.
344See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 3.01; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586.
345See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 2.02[2][a].  State chartered banks are regulated by their 
state’s banking agency as well as by the Federal Reserve, in the case of state member banks, or 
the FDIC, in the case of state nonmember banks.  Id.
346NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 900 (quoting U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, BANK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S. AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE MAY OFFER LESSONS 
FOR MODERNIZING U.S. STRUCTURE (1996)).
347Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587.
348See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 2.02[2][b].
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debate.349  Some commentators have concluded that a net subsidy exists in bad economic times 
and that the subsidy is zero or slightly negative in good economic times.350  The fact that banks 
choose to retain their charters provides some evidence that they at least believe that the federal 
subsidy outweighs the regulatory cost, and the same goes with respect to thrifts.351
Recent federal preemption of state law changes the balance in determining the existence 
of a net federal subsidy because federal preemption reduces regulatory costs for national banks 
and for thrifts.  In fact, some predatory lenders have sought federal charters because of the 
benefits of federal preemption of state law.352  “Associates and Commercial Credit applied for 
thrift charters in late 1997 and early 1998.  Both companies stated that federal preemption of 
individual state regulations accorded federal savings associations was one reason for their 
application.”353  The OTS preemption of state lending laws for thrifts used to be an advantage of 
choosing a thrift charter over a bank charter.354  The OCC has now evened the playing field by
similarly preempting state laws for the benefit of banks which will reduce the regulatory 
compliance costs of banks.  The visitorial powers preemption also reduces regulatory compliance 
349See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586-88; Furlong, supra note 338; Jones & 
Kolatch, supra note 338, at 9-10; Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 338, at 1918-19; Walter, 
supra note 338, at 9.
350See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587; Shull 
& White, supra note 338, at 466-67.  In addition, banks engaging in riskier activities receive a 
larger subsidy than do safer banks.  Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 9.
351See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587; Furlong, supra note 338.
352HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45 n.54.
353Id.
354See MCCOY, supra note 339, §3.02.
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costs.  Thus, the reduction in regulatory costs increases the likelihood that a net federal subsidy 
does exist.
What is the relationship between any net federal subsidy and bank involvement in 
predatory lending?  Certainly when banks or thrifts make predatory loans, purchase predatory 
loans, purchase securities backed by predatory loans, finance predatory lenders with warehouse 
lines of credit, they are profiting to the detriment of affected homeowners.  In addition, bank 
affiliates involved in predatory lending activities may enjoy a spillover of any net federal 
subsidy.355  A spillover can occur when a bank lends money to its affiliate or shifts riskier 
activities from an affiliate to the bank.356
Regardless of whether predatory lenders receive a benefit from any federal subsidy, 
banks and thrifts should avoid direct or indirect involvement in predatory lending activities.  
Banks enjoy a special status of trust in the minds of the public, which is perpetuated by the gross 
federal subsidy.  Banks should not betray that trust by engaging in predatory lending activities or 
advancing the interests of predatory lenders.  Thrifts and national banks should not be exempt 
from state consumer protection laws aimed at stemming the tide of predatory lending activities.
Banks are not the only entities involved in residential mortgage lending that receive 
special federal benefits.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also receive federal benefits and are 
subject to more federal regulation than purely private entities involved in mortgage lending.  But 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have taken an entirely different approach to the problem of 
predatory lending.
355See id. § 4.02; Walter, supra note 338, at 9-10.
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B. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government sponsored enterprises--privately owned 
corporations operating under federal charters that impose restrictions on their activities and grant 
benefits that other private corporations do not enjoy.  The President appoints five of the eighteen 
directors of both Fannie Mae357 and Freddie Mac,358 while the rest are elected by shareholders.  
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  The 
benefits they receive as GSEs include exemption from state taxes except for real property 
taxes359 and exemption from federal securities laws.360  Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
not government agencies, their guarantees are not backed by the full faith and credit of the 
federal government; however, there is an assumption that the federal government would honor 
their obligations in the event of financial trouble.361
356See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587-88; 
Walter, supra note 338, at 9-10.
35712 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (2000).
358Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A).
359Id. § 1433.
360Id. § 1455(g) , 1723(c).
361See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES: POTENTIAL IMPACTS 
OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP 17 (1996).  See also Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief 
Urges Cutback in Scale of 2 Big Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at C1 (“Mr. Greenspan, 
who has long criticized both companies, said they had been able to borrow almost unlimited 
amounts of money at below-market rates by virtue of the widespread by false impression among 
investors that the federal government would ride to their rescue if necessary.”)
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Fannie Mae was the first GSE and had its origins during the Great Depression under the 
New Deal leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.  In response to problems of widespread 
foreclosures during the Depression and wide variation across the country in interest rates and 
availability of mortgages, President Roosevelt’s National Emergency Council recommended the 
establishment of a program for long-term, federally-insured mortgages and the creation of 
national mortgage associations to purchase these mortgages.362  Congress responded by creating 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure home mortgage loans and by authorizing 
the charter of mortgage associations to purchase the insured mortgages.363  In 1938 Congress 
chartered the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, now called Fannie Mae).364
FNMA was initially a government agency that issued bonds to raise funds for the purchase of  
FHA-insured mortgages and, beginning in 1944, Veteran’s Administration (VA)-guaranteed 
mortgages as well.365  In 1968 Congress divided the functions of Fannie Mae between two 
entities--Fannie Mae, which became a GSE and was allocated the secondary market operations 
of the former entity,  and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), which 
362Regulations Implementing Authority of HUD Over Conduct of Secondary Market 
Operations of FNMA, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,200, 36,200 (Sept. 14, 1978).  Until the 1930s, the typical 
home mortgage loans was for only a three- to five-year term.  Id.  Homeowners were required to 
refinance their homes frequently, and during the Great Depression when refinancing was not 
available, many lost their homes to foreclosure. 
363See id. at 36,200-01 (citing National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 479, 48 Stat. 
1252 (1934)).
364See id. at 36,201.  The association was originally named the  National Mortgage 
Association of Washington, but was renamed the Federal National Mortgage Association later 
the same year.  Id.
365See id.
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remained a division of HUD and was given the special assistance and the management and 
liquidation functions of the former Fannie Mae.366
In 1970 the Emergency Home Finance Act created a new GSE, the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and also authorized Fannie Mae to purchase conventional 
mortgages.367  Freddie Mac started the trend towards mortgage securitization in the 1970s, while 
Fannie Mae continued to purchase mortgage loans to be held in its portfolio.  Fannie Mae 
became involved in securitization in the 1980s.  Today Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are almost 
identical in their charters and functions.  They both purchase home loans to hold in their 
portfolios but securitize even more loans.
When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitize loans, the GSEs themselves issue the 
securities.368  The securities are backed by a pool of mortgage loans, and holders of the securities 
generally receive their pro rata share of principal and interest payments.369  In some cases the 
securities are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae.  In most cases no credit enhancement in necessary 
because of the implied federal guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s obligations.
Through their purchases and securitization of residential mortgage loans, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac together provide the largest source of home mortgage financing in the nation.  For 
example, in 2001 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together purchased or securitized forty percent of 
366See id. (citing Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 
802(c), 82 Stat. 476, 536 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716(h) (2000)).
367Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 450, 450-51 (1971) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 1717 (2000)).
368Private securities offerings are usually made by a special purpose entity created for the 
purpose of issuing the securities.  See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text,
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all conventional mortgages originated that year.370  Fannie Mae purchased $568 billion of 
residential mortgage loans and issued $515 billion of mortgage-backed securities in 2001, while 
Freddie Mac purchased $393 billion of residential mortgage loans and issued $387 billion of 
mortgage-backed securities in the same year.371  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac thus facilitate the 
flow of money into the residential mortgage market in accordance with the purposes set out in 
their charters.
In the late 1980s, housing advocates believed that the underwriting guidelines used by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac favored white suburban homebuyers.372  In response Congress 
enacted the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 
(FHEFSSA) to give Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incentives to increase their purchase of loans
to low and moderate-income families and in low and moderate-income neighborhoods.373  The 
Act required HUD to set affordable housing goals for loans purchased by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac,374 and mandated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “lead the industry in affordable 
lending.”375  It also prohibited them from discriminating on the basis of prohibited factors.376
369These securities are called “pass-through” securities.  The GSEs also issue other types 
of securities.
370OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT, MORTGAGE MARKETS AND THE 
ENTERPRISES IN 2001 13 (2002).
371Id. at 13, 17.
372BRENT W. AMBROSE & THOMAS G. THIBODEAU, HUD, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS 
OF THE GSE AFFORDABLE GOALS ON LOW-AND MODERATE-INCOME FAMILIES 2 (2002).
373Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. 13, 
374Id. §1331(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4561(a) (2000)).  HUD set goals for loans 
secured by homes of low- and moderate-income homeowners/renters at 50 percent and loans 
located in underserved areas at 31 percent.  See AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 372, at vii.
375See SENATE REPORT 102-282 § 35.
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Finally, the Act established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight as an office of 
HUD to monitor both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.377
 A recent study sponsored by HUD considered the impact of the affordable housing goals 
required by the FHEFSSA on low and moderate-income families.378  The study found that the 
goals helped make homeownership more attainable for these families.379  In response to 
FHEFSSA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopted more flexible underwriting standards and 
introduced automated underwriting systems which reduced underwriting costs.  As a result, 
lenders that sell loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began using more flexible underwriting 
standards that permitted more borrowers to qualify for the loans.380  In addition, purchases by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of loans to lower income borrowers and in target neighborhoods 
increased liquidity and allowed additional lending activity to these borrowers and in these 
neighborhoods.381  The study suggests that the affordable housing goals have thus helped make 
homeownership more attainable to low and moderate-income families.
In the late 1990s, both GSEs were accused of being involved in the predatory lending 
problem by purchasing and securitizing subprime loans that could be characterized as predatory.  
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac responded immediately with initiatives to avoid purchasing 
376See Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. 13, § 1325(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §4545 (2000)).
377Id. § 1311 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §4511 (2000)).
378AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 372, at vii.
379Id. at ix.
380Id. at vii-ix.
381Id. at ix.
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or securitizing predatory loans.382  Fannie Mae will not purchase or securitize loans with points 
and fees in excess of five percent, loans identified as “high-cost” mortgages under HOEPA, 
loans with prepaid single premium credit insurance, or loans with prepayment premiums unless 
the borrower has received a benefit.383  Fannie Mae requires its lenders to determine the 
borrower’s ability to repay, to avoid steering borrowers to higher-cost loans if they qualify for a 
lower-cost loan, to report a borrower’s entire payment history to credit repositories (to improve 
the borrower’s credit history), and to maintain escrow deposit accounts.384  Freddie Mac will not 
purchase HOEPA loans, loans with single premium credit insurance, loans with prepayment 
penalties that continue for more than three years, or loans with mandatory arbitration clauses.385
Freddie Mac requires its lenders to report a borrower’s entire payment history to credit 
repositories and refuses to purchase loans from lenders that engage in predatory lending 
practices.386
382See Fannie Mae, News Release, Fannie Mae Chairman Announces New Loan 
Guidelines to Combat Predatory Lending Practices (Apr. 11, 2000) at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2000/0710.jhtml [hereinafter Fannie Mae News 
Release] (citing Lender Letter LL03-00, Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished 
Credit Histories, 4/11/00); Freddie Mac, News Release, Freddie Mac Announces Steps to Protect 
Borrowers from Predatory Lending Practices (Mar. 24, 2000), at
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives2000/predatory.htm.
383See Fannie Mae News Release, supra note 382.
384See id.
385See Freddie Mac, Combating Predatory Lending, Freddie Mac’s Efforts to Protect 
America’s Consumers, at http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/anti-predatory.html
386See id.
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More recently, the GSEs have been criticized on the basis that they are failing to “lead 
the industry in affordable housing.”387  While the GSEs have become involved in the subprime 
market, their involvement has been primarily limited to purchasing loans to A- borrowers.388
They have not purchased or securitized loans to B, C, and D rated borrowers.  HUD has 
encouraged both GSEs to become involved in subprime mortgage lending to a greater extent.389
Several states exempted the GSEs from the application of their predatory lending statutes 
or limited the application of the statutes to the GSEs.390  The GSEs sought exemption from 
Georgia’s statute before it was enacted, but received negative publicity for doing so.391  As a 
result, they withdrew their proposal and have since avoided seeking additional exemptions or 
limitations.392  Thus, the GSEs have continued to purchase and securitize loans in all fifty states 
in compliance with state predatory lending statutes in those states that have such statutes and 
have not exempted the GSEs.
387David S. Hilzenrath, HUD Chief Criticized Fannie Mae, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at 
E02.  In recent years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been criticized on numerous fronts.  
They have been criticized on the basis that they have an unfair competitive advantage over
wholly private mortgage investors, based on concerns about their financial stability and the 
feared effects of their failure on the national economy, and because of misleading financial 
disclosures.  See Andrews, supra note 361, at C1; Stephen Labaton, Limits Urged in Mortgage 
Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1.
388See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 74; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 
26, at 46.  The GSEs also purchase loans to “Alt-A” borrowers, “prime borrowers who desire 
low down payments or do not want to provide full documentation for loans.”  Id. at 46 n.56.
389See Hilzenrath, supra note 387, at E02.
390See, e.g., D.C. and California ; see also Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending 
Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation: Federal Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78, 84 (2002).
391Patrick Barts, Fannie Mae in Tiff Over Abusive Loans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2002, at 
A1. 
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The GSEs, therefore, have taken a very different approach to the problem of predatory 
lending from that of banks and thifts.  The GSEs have become involved in the purchase and 
securitization of subprime loans, have adopted policies designed to avoid the purchase of loans 
with predatory terms, and have for the most part remained subject to compliance with state laws.  
National banks and thrifts on the other hand have claimed their hands to be clean and have now 
avoided the requirement of complying with state law.  In the defense of banks, they have been 
involved in the subprime market beyond the A- credit level.  However, by avoiding compliance 
with state law, some banks can remain a part of the problem.
VI. FEDERAL LAW SHOULD NOT PREEMPT STATE PREDATORY LENDING STATUTES
Although the validity of the OCC’s  preemption of state lending laws for national banks 
is still in question,393 no doubt exists that Congress may if it chooses preempt state predatory 
lending statutes altogether or may expressly grant to federal agencies the power to preempt the 
statutes as applied to banks and thrifts.  The issue then is the normative case for federal 
preemption of state predatory lending laws; that is, whether Congress should preempt state 
predatory lending laws for all lenders, as would the bill currently before it, and whether federal 
agencies should preempt the laws for thrifts, banks, and their operating subsidiaries.
A. States Traditional Role in Real Estate Finance and in Consumer Protection
392See Lampe, supra note 390, at 84.
393See supra Part IV.D.
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Real estate finance law was traditionally an area governed by the states.  Although the 
federal government became involved in creating housing policies and housing programs during 
the New Deal, it was only in the 1960s that the federal government first became involved in 
direct regulation of real estate finance.394  Most of the early statutes were disclosure laws that 
created a minimum standard.395  Congress made it clear that these statutes were only to preempt 
state law to the extent of a conflict.396  Although Congress has acted in several areas to expressly 
preempt state law,397 the bulk of law governing real estate finance is still state law.
Consumer protection also has traditionally been primarily a state responsibility.  While 
the federal government has also been involved in specific areas of consumer protection, 
particularly through the FTC, these measures have traditionally been in addition to state 
consumer protection laws and have been treated as creating a minimum standard rather than 
preempting the field.  HOEPA creates a minimum standard, but does not otherwise preempt state 
law.398
394See Alexander, supra note 225, at 311-13.
395See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968 (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-312, tit. I, 83 Stat. 146 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000)); Real Estate Settlement and Procedures 
Act of 1974 (RESPA), Pub. L. No. 95-533, § 4, 88 Stat. 1724, 1725 (1974) (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (2000)).  See also Kathleen Keest, The Consumer Lending Revolution: 
Economic Consequences, The Regulatory & Legislative Framework, available at 
www.responsiblelending.org (“[TILA and RESPA] were additions to, not substitutes for, the 
substantive regulation in state law.  Disclosure was not the endgame, and federal law generally 
set the floor, not the ceiling.”).
396See Alexander, supra note 225, at 315.
397See DIDMCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f -7a (2000); Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3803 (2000); 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2000).
398See Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762, 
766 (2002), quoted supra in note 295.
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Because of the tradition of state governance of real estate finance and consumer 
protection laws, advocates of federal preemption of state law bear the burden to support a change 
in policy and show that federal regulation would be superior.  While there are advantages to 
uniformity, they are not outweighed by the benefits of letting each state choose its approach to 
the problem of predatory lending.
B. The Role of State and Federal Government
1. Our Federal System
Numerous advantages exist to a system of varying state laws, and the Supreme Court 
outlined those advantages in Gregory v. Ashcroft:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous 
advantages.  It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to 
the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen 
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.399
The fact that different states have reacted differently to the problem of predatory lending 
indicates a need for different solutions.  The fifty states vary along racial, religious, and cultural 
399501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citing McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ 
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)).
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lines,400 and the differences among the states have resulted in varying political climates and 
differing approaches to societal issues.401  The differences are apparent in the types of consumer 
protection measures that a state may adopt for home mortgage borrowers.  Some states take an 
activist approach to protecting consumers with statutory rights of redemption,402 one action 
rules,403 stringent limitations on deficiency judgments,404 and strong predatory lending laws.405
Other states take a more “hands off” approach favoring business interests.
State legislatures can be responsive to their citizens in a way that the federal government 
cannot.  Congress may enact laws that are responsive to the needs of most Americans but that 
may not be responsive to the needs of the citizens of a particular state.  Two empirical studies 
suggest that state legislators are responsive to public opinion in their states.406  Not surprisingly, 
400See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law 
in the 1900s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 
1301 (1991).
401Id.
402See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1282 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 729.010-90, 
726(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 580.23, 580.24 (2000); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 66-8-101, 66-8-102 (2004).
403See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.430 (2002); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-37-1 (2002).
404See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (2003); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-1-32 (Supp. 2005).
405See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
406Schill, supra note 400, at 1311-12.  One study used the percentage of votes for George 
McGovern in the 1972 presidential election to indicate the liberal or conservative nature of a 
state compared with liberal state policies.  David C. Nice, Representation in the States: 
Policymaking and Ideology, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 404, 405-06 (1983).  The other study used a survey 
which asked residents of different states whether they considered themselves to be liberal, 
conservative or moderate and compared the results with state policies.  Gerald C. Wright, Jr., 
Robert S. Erikson & John P. McIver, Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American 
States, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 980, 985 (1987).
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the studies conclude that laws of more liberal states reflect liberal policies while the laws of more 
conservative states reflect more conservative policies.407  Therefore, legislatures in more liberal 
states may enact tougher consumer protection measures, while legislatures in more conservative 
states may regulate subprime lenders to a lesser degree.
Another advantage of state regulation is that it allows for experimentation with different 
approaches.408  When one state finds an effective solution, others can follow.409  When a state 
chooses an approach that does not work, it affects fewer people than would a federal law.410  And 
states can learn from the mistakes made in other states.
Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that state legislatures cannot react quickly 
enough to remedy ineffective attempts at stemming predatory lending practices, and may 
therefore cut off the flow of legitimate credit to their states.  However, experience has shown that 
state legislatures have been able to react quickly.  For example, when state law threatened to 
restrict the availability of credit in Georgia, the legislature acted quickly to revise the law.411
Today state legislatures are more able to react quickly and responsively to state concerns.  
New or amended constitutions in many states now permit annual sessions of the legislature and 
407See Nice, supra note 406, at 408; Wright et al., supra note 406, at 989.
408See generally Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States 
as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005).
409For example, North Carolina’s predatory lending statute has been emulated, and the 
assignee liability provisions of Georgia’s law have been copied.  See supra notes 122 and 138 
and accompanying text.
410Georgia legislators obviously felt that they had made a mistake in the original statute, 
but only the people of Georgia were affected and only for a short time.  See supra notes 135-36 
and accompanying text.
411See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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have removed limits on the length of sessions.412  Legislators have higher salaries and 
professional staffs available to assist them,413 providing legislatures with more adequate 
resources to react to state needs and the desires of their constituents.
2. Law Enforcement
Federal law enforcement has been very successful in prosecuting the largest predatory 
lending offenders,414 but states are more effective in prosecuting local and smaller actors.415  It is 
unlikely that the FTC or the Federal Reserve Board would prosecute small, localized mortgage 
bankers and mortgage brokers.  They are simply too small to attract the attention of these large 
federal actors who will generally allocate their resources to the larger offenders.  Yet it is very 
often the local mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, and contractors that are at the root of the 
predatory lending problem.416  State attorneys general and local officials on the other hand are 
equipped to prosecute the small actors.  Also, state and federal governments can more effectively 
work together if the hands of state and local officials are not tied.
3. Federal Law as a Minimum Standard
412See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF 
STATE GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY 45-49 (1985), cited in Schill, supra note 400 at 1306.
413See Schill, supra note 400, at 1307 (citing Alan Rosenthal, The Legislative Institution: 
Transformed and at Risk, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 69, 73-75 (Carl E. Van Horn, ed. 1989) 
and JEFFREY R. HENIG, PUBLIC POLICY AND FEDERALISM 40 (1985)).
414See supra notes 12-15 and 100-03 and accompanying text.
415See HUD/TREASURY, supra note 26, at 83.
416See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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The tradition of federal law in the areas of real estate finance and consumer protection 
has been to set the minimum standard.417  HOEPA was enacted in this tradition, and states have 
been free to set higher standard.  Thus, some state legislatures have felt a need to protect their 
residents by enacting additional and stronger measures.  Other state legislatures have enacted 
state law with the same level of protection as HOEPA, while still others have not acted at all.418
A stronger federal law as minimum standard would eliminate the need for individual 
states to act.  However, a significantly stronger federal law is unlikely in today’s political 
climate.419  One proposed bill before Congress would weaken HOEPA, while at the same time 
expressly  preempting state predatory lending laws.420  If Congress continues to set a low 
minimum standard, then states should be free to act.  If Congress wants uniformity, then it needs 
to set a higher bar.
C. “Onerous” Provisions of State Statutes
One of the objections that proponents of preemption have to state predatory lending 
statutes is that their terms are too burdensome for lenders.421  Advocates for the subprime lending 
417See supra subpart A.
418See supra Part II.B.
419Congress recently enacted a Bankruptcy Reform bill that is not favorable to debtors.  
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
420See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
421See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, 
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, 
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mortgage Brokers).
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industry argue that borrowers should have the option to choose a prepayment penalty provision 
in order to get a lower interest rate,422 and that yield spread premiums should not be included in 
the trigger for determining a high cost loan because the fees benefit homeowners.423  They argue 
that homeowners should have more choices while ignoring the reality that the unsophisticated 
homeowners who fall victim to predatory lenders do not have the bargaining power or the 
understanding to make meaningful choices.
Critics of state regulation of predatory lending are particularly opposed the extension of 
liability to assignees of predatory loans.424  With regard to the issue of assignee liability, the 
experiences of Georgia and New Jersey are instructive.  When liability for assignees went too 
far, the rating agencies would not rate securities, so lenders would not lend.  But under Georgia’s 
current regime of assignee liability, as well as in New Jersey, the rating agencies have continued 
to rate securities, and lenders have continued to lend.
Creation of assignee liability is one of the most effective means of dealing with predatory 
lenders.  The parties that buy and securitize mortgage loans are involved in multiple transactions, 
while consumers are not.  Consumers cannot simply go to another lender after a bad experience 
with the first, but the parties who purchase loans to securitize them or hold them in portfolio can.  
Also, investors can and do protect themselves with buyback provisions.  As a result, purchasers 
of mortgage loans on the secondary market are the parties best equipped to police the originators.
422See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable 
Lending).
423See id. at 6 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable 
Lending), 3 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
424See id. at 8 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable 
Lending), 4 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n).
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Assertions of the need for uniformity may simply be a smoke screen for those who 
simply want lower standards of consumer protection.425  The conservative lawmakers who are 
pushing for federal preemption are the same lawmakers who would usually champion states 
rights and favor state law over federal law.  The current Republican-dominated Congress has 
shown itself more likely to adopt measures that are not as consumer-friendly as some states.  
Preemption of state law is therefore one way to support lending interests and ensure a low level 
of consumer protection.  The result, of course, is that predatory lending practices continue with 
little effective curtailment.
D. Availability of Credit
425See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the 
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005).
If uniformity in predatory lending laws is desirable, then another approach is through 
uniform state law.  Through the uniform law adoption process, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws can consider the views of the various interest groups.  
They can also consider the success and failure of various state approaches.  With a uniform act 
available, state legislatures can still be flexible and responsive to the needs of their constituents 
by making changes to the uniform act or by not adopting it at all.
Attempts to promulgate broad uniform statutes covering real estate finance have not been 
effective.  No state adopted either the Uniform Land Transactions Act adopted by NCCUSL in 
1974 or the Uniform Land Security Interest Act adopted by NCCUSL in 1985.  See NELSON & 
WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 670.  In 2002, the NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure Act.  It has yet to be adopted in any state.  More limited attempts at reform have 
been effective, however, with states adopting uniform acts relating to condominiums and risk of 
loss in real estate contracts.   See id., at 91.  A uniform act regulating predatory lending practices 
might be an effective means for making the law more uniform while preserving the ability of 
states to be responsive to their citizens.  A disadvantage would be the lengthy time frame that 
drafting and adoption would require.
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Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that they will reduce the amount of 
subprime credit available.426  It is true that measures addressing predatory lending keep some 
loans from being made.  However, some loans simply should not be made because their terms 
are too onerous or unfair.  In some cases, the borrower could obtain a loan on better terms from a 
legitimate subprime lender.  However, if the borrower cannot repay the loan, the borrower 
should not be extended the credit.  In the legitimate subprime lending market, A- borrowers 
typically pay interest rates that are about a half of a percent higher than prime borrowers.  C and 
D borrowers pay interest rates as much as four percent above prime rates.427  Lenders who 
charge much higher interest rates on a fully secured home mortgage loans are simply taking 
advantage of borrowers.
Furthermore, critics of state predatory lending statutes have not provided evidence that 
the statutes have in fact reduced the availability of legitimate subprime credit.  In fact, North 
Carolina proves otherwise.  Since the North Carolina statute became effective in 2000, subprime 
loans have remained available, while the incidence of predatory loans and loans with unfair 
terms has decreased.428  Certainly, the proponents of federal preemption who seek to remove 
state control over local predatory lending problems have the burden to prove that the state 
statutes do in fact affect the availability of subprime credit.
426See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, 
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, 
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mortgage Brokers).
427See HUD/TREASURY, supra note 26, at 28.
428See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, 
CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).  See also notes 121-25 and 
accompanying text.
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E. Efficiency Concerns
Proponents of federal preemption assert that the mortgage market cannot operate 
efficiently with a patchwork of state requirements.429  Lenders argue that it is too burdensome for 
them to comply with different requirements in each state.  They argue that the cost of compliance 
will increase the cost of credit or make it unavailable.
These concerns are not valid for two reasons.  First, because origination is a local 
function, the originator can and should be responsible for compliance with local law.  Secondly, 
originators and investors in mortgage loans are already required to comply with a patchwork of 
state laws, so the cost of additional state law restrictions should not be overestimated.
1. Horizontal Segmentation of the Mortgage Market Makes Compliance 
With State Law More Practical
Unlike earlier times, when mortgage markets were local, today’s mortgage market is a 
national, or even international market.  Today the market is not segmented by locale, but rather 
by function, with the ownership and investment functions existing separately from origination 
and servicing.  While capital comes into the mortgage market at a national level, origination is 
still primarily a local function.  Most mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers have offices in the 
markets in which they operate, particularly in the subprime market.
429See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, 
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, 
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mortgage Brokers).
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An investor in mortgages or mortgage-backed securities does not have to know how to 
comply with local law, but can leave that function to the originator.430  Since most predatory 
lending issues arise at origination, it is appropriate that the originator, typically with a local 
office, be charged with state law compliance.  Purchasers of mortgages can and do protect 
themselves with buy back requirements –requirements that the originator buy back any loans that 
do not meet certain standards.  So losses related to non-compliance with state law occur only 
when the originator is judgment proof or bankrupt.  Ultimately, purchasers of mortgages can 
protect themselves by carefully selecting the originators with whom they do business.431
2. Lenders Already Comply With Varying State Requirements
Because real estate finance law has always been to a great extent state law, a patchwork 
of state law already exists.  States differ in their mortgage theory,432 in the availability of and 
requirements for pre-foreclosure remedies,433 in the type of foreclosure permitted,434 in the 
430Servicers also must comply with local law, but at a different stage of the process.  Most 
predatory lending issues arise at origination.
431This is one approach that Freddie Mac has used in its efforts to combat predatory 
lending.  See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
432Three theories of mortgages exist in the United States–title theory, lien theory and 
intermediate theory.  See Robert Kratovil, Mortgages–Problems in Possession, Rents, and 
Mortgage Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1961).  In title theory states a mortgage lender is 
treated as having title, in a sense, to the mortgaged property.   Id.  In lien theory states a 
mortgage lender is treated as having only a security interest in the mortgaged property and may 
not take possession until after foreclosure.  Id.  In intermediate theory states a mortgage lender 
has a hybrid interest.   which gives the lender the right to possession of the property after a 
default under the mortgage.  Id.  The majority of states are lien theory states.  See GRANT S. 
NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.2 (4th ed. 2001).
433In title theory states, the lender has the right, in theory, to possess the property at the 
time the borrower executes the mortgage.  As a practical matter, however, borrowers retain 
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logistics of power of sale foreclosure where it is permitted,435 in the availability of a 
deficiency,436 and in the availability and means of statutory redemption after foreclosure.437  As a 
result, loan documents vary greatly from state to state.  Closing practices also vary greatly from 
state to state with loan closings typically handled by title companies in some states, by lenders in 
other states, and by attorneys in still other states.438
Since lenders must already deal with this patchwork of laws and practices in the various 
states, adding requirements under a predatory lending statute is not as onerous is it would seem.  
Lenders must already have separate loan documents, disclosure documents, closing 
possession until default by agreement with the lender.  See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 432, 
§ 4.1; see also Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 183, § 26 (giving the borrower a statutory right to 
possession until default in the absence of an agreement to the contrary).  In intermediate theory 
states, the lender has the right to possession of the property after a default.  Kratovil, supra note 
432, at 4-5.  In lien theory states, the lender may only take possession after foreclosure.  Id. at 5-
6.  However, many lien theory states permit the lender to take possession of the property after 
default by agreement with the borrower.  See, e.g., Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 115 
P.2d 450, 452 (Cal. 1941); Topeka Sav. Ass’n v. Beck, 428 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1967); Central 
Sav. Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 181 U.W.2d 261, 264 (Neb. 1970); Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248 P. 
481, 483 (Utah 1926).
States differ in the requirements that a lender must meet in order to obtain the 
appointment of a receiver, NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 432, § 4.33, and in the effect given 
an assignment of rents, Julia P. Forrester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach to Rents as 
Security for the Mortgage Loan, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 349, 361-62 (1993).
434About thirty states permit power of sale foreclosure, while the rest permit only judicial 
foreclosure.  See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 432, § 7.19.
435See id.  States vary greatly in their requirements for notice of a foreclosure sale, with 
variations including the method of notice, the notice period, and the parties who must be given 
notice.  See id.
436See id. § 8.1.  Some states prohibit a deficiency judgment under certain circumstances, 
while others limiting the amount of the deficiency.  See id. § 8.3.
437More than half of the jurisdictions have statutory redemption, but the specifics of the 
various statutes vary greatly.  Id. § 8.4.
438See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 244.
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requirements, and closing practices for each state in which they do business.  Therefore, adding 
an additional state law variable should not increase the cost to the extent that proponents of 
preemption claim.
Evidence exists that interest rates are relatively insensitive to the variation in state 
mortgage law.439  Additional protection for mortgagors under state law does not increase interest 
rates to the extent that critics have proposed.440  Therefore, it is difficult to support preemption of 
state law considering the longstanding tradition of state law in the areas of real estate and 
consumer protection and considering the advantages offered by giving states autonomy over 
protecting their residents.
F. The Role of Federally-Supported Lenders
1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently operate within the patchwork of state 
laws for real estate finance and the new predatory lending laws, the GSEs have been criticized 
for their failure to “lead the market” in loans to low-income families and in low-income 
neighborhoods.441   Indeed, the GSEs should expand their role in leading the market by 
purchasing more than just A- subprime loans.  A large majority of subprime borrowers fall into 
the A- category anyway, substantially fewer into the B category, and fewer still in the C and D 
439See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. 
L. REV. 489, 491 (1991).
440See id.
441See supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text.
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categories.442  Therefore, a small presence in supporting loans in these lower categories will have 
a larger impact on the markets for these loans.
In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can lead the market by creating standards for 
subprime loans.  One of the roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in promoting the smooth 
operation of housing finance market has been to create sets of forms for home mortgage lenders 
to use in the various states.443  In the prime market, even lenders who do not intend to sell their 
loans to the GSEs tend to use these forms because the uniformity makes their loans more 
marketable on the secondary market.444  In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have created 
automated underwriting systems for the prime market and more recently for A- subprime 
loans.445  The GSEs can further their goal of leading the market by producing forms for subprime 
loans that comply with the patchwork of predatory lending laws and by creating underwriting 
standards for subprime lending.
2. Federally Chartered Banks and Thrifts
442
“The National Home Equity Mortgage Association reports that the “A-minus” segment 
makes up 60 percent, the “B” segment 30 percent, the “C” segment 9 percent, and the “D” 
segment 1 percent of the market.  Inside B&C Lending reports that the “A-minus” segment 
makes up 73 percent, the “B” segment 13 percent, the “C” segment 9 percent, and the “D” 
segment 5 percent of the market.”  HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 34 (citing 
Correspondents Reign Supreme in 1999, INSIDE B&C LENDING, Mar. 10, 2000).  
443See http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/;
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/.
444See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 
U.C.L.A. L.REV. 951, 971 (1997).
445KENNETH TEMKIN, JENNIFER E. H. JOHNSON, DIANE LEVY, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, FOR 
U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, 
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Banks and thrifts argue that they have not been part of the predatory lending problem and 
should therefore be exempt from state laws.  While few banks may have been directly involved 
in originating predatory loans, they have been involved through affiliates, by purchasing 
predatory loans and securities backed by predatory loans, and by financing predatory lenders.446
Further, it is likely that current federal regulations preempting banks and their operating 
subsidiaries from the operation of state predatory lending laws will make it easier for banks to be 
involved in predatory lending.  For example, banks can now move their subprime lending 
operations into operating subsidiaries to avoid the operation of state law, and banks themselves 
can purchase or take security interests in predatory loans without fear of the assignee liability 
provisions of state law.
Theoretically, the OCC will be monitoring banks to prevent predatory lending abuses, but 
the OCC may not have the resources to monitor activities of national banks and their operating 
subsidiaries.  The OCC’s primary responsibility is to monitor the safety and soundness of 
national banks and their affiliates.447  The agency is responsible for more than 1900 national 
banks448 and in 2003 could not provide a list of their operating subsidiaries because “the number 
and names of the operating subsidiaries were constantly changing.”449  Today the OCC maintains 
AND RISK-BASED PRICING vii, 21 (2002), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf.
446See supra notes 321-37 and accompanying text.
447See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm.
448See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks Active As of 9/30/05, 
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/foia/nblist_Name_St_City_BankNet.pdf.
449NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 13 n.26.
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a list on its website of “many of the national bank operating subsidiaries that do business directly 
with consumers.”450  In October 2005, the list included the names of more than 300 
companies,451 but it is constantly changing because bank holding companies reorganize their 
holdings on a relatively frequent basis.452  Furthermore, the agency may not have the motivation 
to find and prosecute predatory lending abuses in the ranks of the institutions it regulates because 
its funding comes primarily from the assessments on the banks it regulates rather than from 
Congress.453
The OCC’s preemption of state law is truly a “race to the bottom.”454  By providing the 
most lenient regime for regulating predatory lending practices, the OCC can encourage national 
banks to keep their federal charters and state banks to switch to federal charters.455  Because the 
OCC’s budget is funded primarily by large national banks whose interests are served by the 
preemption rule, the OCC can ensure the preeminence of the national banking system.456  This is 
450Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Operating Subsidiaries of National Banks, 
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/OpSublist.pdf.
451See id.
452See Comments of the National Consumer Law Center to Office of Comptroller of 
Currency, Docket No. 04-08, Apr. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/test_and_comm/04_26_04_ER.shtml.
453See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm.
454William Cary’s classic article describes Delaware’s lenient corporation law as the 
result of its success in a “race for the bottom.”  William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).  Delaware created a favorable 
climate for corporate management in order to attract new business to the state.  Id.
455See Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 275.
456See id. at 276-79.
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further evidence that the OCC will have little incentive to prosecute predatory lending abuses 
among these institutions.
Banks and thrifts should be a part of the solution rather than being part of the problem.  
They should be subject to state consumer protection laws as the GSEs have been.  Because banks 
and thrifts receive the benefit of the federal safety net, they have a special obligation to the 
public.  They and their affiliates should be subject to the same standards as other lenders.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the federal government should not preempt state predatory lending laws 
either through regulations applicable only to federally chartered banks and thrifts or through 
legislation applicable to all lenders.  Real estate finance and consumer protection have 
traditionally been areas governed by state law, and where the federal government has intervened 
in these areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a minimum standard for 
consumer protection rather than preempting the field of regulation.  When state governments 
regulate, they can be more responsive to the needs of their citizens and can be innovative in 
trying new solutions.  Further, state enforcers are more likely to prosecute small actors in 
predatory lending that federal enforcers may ignore.
Varying state laws are not as onerous on lenders as they may claim.  Since subprime 
loans tend to be originated by local mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, they can comply 
with local law, and investors can police their originators and purchase only from those that 
comply with local law.  The states already have varying requirements for real estate finance, so 
adding additional requirements is only a matter of revising forms and standards that already vary 
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from state to state.  Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can further their regulatory goals 
of leading the market in loans to low-income families and in low-income neighborhoods by 
creating standards that originators can use to comply with each state’s law and by purchasing 
more subprime loans, including loans to subprime borrowers with less than A- credit. 
Banks, thrifts, and their affiliates have not earned the special treatment that they receive 
under new regulations.  Furthermore, the OCC does not have the resources or motivation to 
regulate national banks and their operating subsidiaries to the extent they should be regulated.  
Congress should override the OCC and OTS determinations that their regulations preempt state 
predatory lending laws.
Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far been inadequate and 
unsuccessful.  The federal government should not make the problem worse by tying the hands of 
state legislatures and state attorney generals who are tying to combat the problem.  Federal 
preemption, where state laws are more restrictive, simply adds fuel to the fire by insulating 
predatory lenders from effective oversight and sanctions.  The federal government must stop 
mortgaging the American dream.
